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INTRODUCTION
In 1940, Justice Felix Frankfurter admonished a federal appellate
court on the need to observe distinctions between the administrative
process and the judicial process. He observed that"[m] odern administra-
tive tribunals are the outgrowth of conditions far different from those" of
traditional Anglo-American court procedures, rules of evidence, and judicial
review.' Justice Frankfurter noted that "[t]hese differences in origin and
function preclude wholesale transplantation of the rules of procedure, trial
and review which have evolved from the history and experience of courts"
to the administrative process.2 The Court emphasized that "unless these
vital differentiations between the functions ofjudicial and administrative
tribunals are observed, courts will stray outside their province and read
the laws of Congress through the distorting lenses of inapplicable legal
doctrine."3 This admonishment stands equally as a warning for anyone
who is involved with any administrative process, and has been recognized
through the years.'
1 FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 142 (1940).
2 Id. at 143.
3 Id. at 144.
4 Justice Brennan, writing for the Court thirty-six years later, noted the following:
We reiterate the wise admonishment of Mr. Justice Frankfurter that
differences in the origin and function ofadministrative agencies preclude
wholesale transplantation of the rules of procedure, trial and review
which have evolved from the history and experience of courts.'
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) (citing FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S.
134, 143 (1940)). Two years later, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, stated,
this much is absolutely clear. Absent constitutional constraints or ex-
tremely compelling circumstances the "administrative agencies 'should
be free to fashion their own rules of procedure and to pursue methods
of inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their multitudinous
duties.' FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S., at 290, 85 S. Ct., 1467, quoting from
FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co. 309 U.S., at 143, 60 S. Ct., at 441.
Indeed, our cases could hardly be more explicit in this regard.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 543-44 (1978). In subse-
quent years, the Court has continued to cite Pottsville Broadcasting Co. to support its
holdings. Sims v. Commissioner of Social Security, 513 U.S. 103, 110 (2000) ("it is well
settled that there are wide differences between administrative agencies and courts.");
Shepard v. NLRB, 459 U.S. 344, 351 (1983) ("[tlhe Board is not a court; it is not even a
labor court; it is an administrative agency charged by Congress with the enforcement and
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This article argues that, in issuing his penalty assessment orders,
decision makers of the United States Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") Administrator have "stray[ed] outside their province and read
the congressional laws through the distorting lenses of inapplicable legal
doctrine."5 Without regard for the "laws of Congress" which govern the
administrative process, but, rather, using the judicial process as a tem-
plate, each of several Administrative Law Judges ("ALJs") has acted as an
independent trial judge issuing final decisions, and the Environmental
Appeals Board ("EAB"), delegated by the Administrator his final decision-
making authority, has acted as a court of appeals, deferring to the decision-
making of each of the several ALJs.' As a consequence, instead of final
decisions of the Administrator manifesting the consistent application of law,
and the policy and discretion of one Administrator, these final decisions
have become ad hoc, their contents determined by the personal views and
predilections of whichever ALJ has been assigned the case. As we shall
later see, inconsistency in the Administrator's penalty assessment has been
a concern the Government Accountability Office ("GAO") has brought to
the attention of Congress over the course of a number of years.
Part I of this article reviews relevant provisions of the United States
Constitution and of the laws of Congress which govern the Administrator's
civil penalty assessment process. Part II reviews the rules promulgated
by the Administrator, setting out the process by which he exercises his
authority to assess civil penalties for violations of the various federal envi-
ronmental statutes. Part III reviews various decisions made on behalf of
the Administrator. Some concluding comments will follow.
I. THE LAW GOVERNING THE ADMINISTRATOR'S ASSESSMENT OF
PENALTIES
A. Constitutional Sources of Authority
The Constitution provides: "WE THE PEOPLE of the United States,
in Order to form a more perfect Union, ... promote the general Welfare,
administration of the federal labor laws.").
' Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. at 144.6 The Board was created by the Administrator on February 13, 1992. Prior to his creation
of the Board, a Chief Judicial Officer ("CJO") was delegated authority by the Administrator
to issue his final decisions. Changes to Regulations to Reflect the Role of the New Environ-
mental Appeals Board in Agency Adjudications, 57 Fed. Reg. 5320 (Feb. 13, 1992) (codified
at 40 C.F.R. §§ 1, 3, 17, 22, 27, 57, 60, 66, 85, 86, 114, 123, 124, 164, 209, 222, 223, 233,
and 403).
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and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."7
It further provides that
[tihe Congress shall have Power To... provide for
the common Defence [sic] and general Welfare of the United
States;
... And To make all Laws which shall be neces-
sary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in
the Government of the United States, or in any Department
or Officer thereof.'
Pursuant to this authority, Congress has passed numerous statutes
regulating human activity harmful to the environment of the United States.
With these statutes, Congress invested in the Administrator the authority
to assess civil penalties for their violation. In upholding the constitution-
ality of the assessment of civil penalties by executive authority under a
statute passed by Congress to regulate safety in the workplace, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the remedial nature of the statute,
and recognized that, by the use of administratively imposed civil penalties
"[b]usiness is encouraged to comply with the law not only because that
is what the law exacts but because failing to do so will bring down on the
activity or purse noncriminal consequences."9 That decision incorporates
a listing of the numerous federal statutes then in existence, including envi-
ronmental statutes, in which Congress provided for the administrative
assessment of civil penalties against violators.1 ° In upholding the Fifth
Circuit decision, the Supreme Court stated,
it was within the competency of Congress, when legislating
as to matters exclusively within its control, to impose appro-
priate obligations and sanction their enforcement by reason-
able money penalties, giving to executive officers the power
to enforce such penalties without the necessity of invoking
the judicial power."
7 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
Id. art. I, § 8.
9Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, U.S. Dep't of Labor,
518 F.2d 990, 1009 (5th Cir. 1975).
10 Id. at 1003-09.
11 Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Health & Safety Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442,451
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B. Federal Statutory Authority
1. The Federal Environmental Statutes
In various federal environmental statutes, Congress specifically
and exclusively authorized the Administrator to assess civil penalties for
their violation, and Congress specifically and exclusively authorized the
Administrator to determine the amount of civil penalty, by considering or
taking into account the particular penalty criteria identified in the statute. 2
For instance: "The Administrator may issue an administrative
order... assessing a civil administrative penalty" and, in determining the
amount of civil penalty to assess, "the Administrator... shall take into
consideration" the statutory penalty criteria identified. 3 And: "A civil
penalty for a violation ... shall be assessed by the Administrator" and
"[i] n determining the amount of a civil penalty, the Administrator shall
take into account" the statutory penalty criteria identified."l Congress
further provides in these statutes that, prior to assessing any civil pen-
alty, "the Administrator" must serve notice on the alleged violator of his
proposed penalty order, and the alleged violator's right to an opportunity
for a hearing. For instance:
An administrative penalty assessed under paragraph (1)
shall be assessed by the Administrator by an order made
after opportunity for a hearing on the record in accordance
with sections 554 and 556 of title 5 .... Before issuing
n.9 (1977) (citing Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 215 U.S. 320,339 (1909)).
12 Clean Water Act of 1977 ("CWA"), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (2000); Toxic
Substances Control Act of 1986 ("TSCA"), 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a) (2000); Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1947 ("FIFRA"), 7 U.S.C. § 1361 (2000); Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 ("EPCRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 11045 (2000);
Clean Air Act ("CAA"), 42 U.S.C. 7413(d) (2000), invalidated by Tenn. Valley Auth. v.
Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2003), on the grounds that an administrative com-
pliance order cannot be the basis for the imposition of civil penalties; Safe Drinking
Water Act of 1974 ("SDWA"), 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(g) (2000); Marine Protection, Research
and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 ("MPRSA"), 33 U.S.C. § 1415(a) (2000); and the Solid Waste
Disposal Act ("SWDA"), 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (2000). By Executive Order 12580 (January 23,
1987), the President delegated his penalty assessment authority under section 109(b) of
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980
("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. § 9609(b) (2000), to the Administrator.
13 CAA § 113, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)-(e) (2000).
14 TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)(A) (2000).
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such an order, the Administrator shall give written notice
to the person to be assessed an administrative penalty of
the Administrator's proposal to issue such order and provide
such person an opportunity to request such a hearing on
the order. 5
And:
A civil penalty for a violation of section section [sic] 2614
or 2689 of this title shall be assessed by the Administrator
by an order made on the record after opportunity (provided
in accordance with this subparagraph) for a hearing in
accordance with section 554 of title 5. Before issuing such
an order, the Administrator shall give written notice to the
person to be assessed a civil penalty under such order of
the Administrator's proposal to issue such order and provide
such person an opportunity to request, within 15 days of the
date the notice is received by such person, such a hearing
on the order.
16
2. The Administrative Procedure Act
The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") is codified in Title 5 of
the United States Code.' 7 Enacted in 1946, the APA
sets a pattern designed to achieve relative uniformity in
the administrative machinery of the Federal Government.
It effectuates needed reforms in the administrative process
and at the same time preserves the effectiveness of the laws
which are enforced by the administrative agencies of the
Government.'"
15 CAA § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(2)(A).
16 TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)(A).
17 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2000).
18 TOM C. CLARK, ATTORNEY GENERAL, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
MANUALONTHEADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDUREAcT 5 (1947) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
MANUAL]. This manual is "the Government's own most authoritative interpretation of
the APA" and one which the Supreme Court "[has] repeatedly given great weight," as it
"was prepared by the same Office of the Assistant Solicitor General that had advised
Congress in the latter stages of enacting the APA, and was originally issued 'as a guide
to the agencies in adjusting their procedures to the requirements of the Act.'" Bowen v.
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With exceptions not applicable to this discussion, Congress directs
that section 554 of title 5 "applies, according to the provisions thereof,
in every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on the
record after opportunity for an agency hearing." 9 Congress provides that
persons who are subject to agency" action have a right to certain notice,2'
and that "[t]he agency shall give all interested parties opportunity for"
making a response to proposed agency action, and "to the extent that the
parties are unable so to determine a controversy by consent, hearing and
decision on notice and in accordance with sections 556 and 557 of this
title."22 Congress provides that an ALJ may be appointed to conduct any
hearing that is necessary, and, in conducting any such hearing, the actions
of the ALT are "[slubject to the published rules of the agency and within its
powers." 2' This provision has been interpreted to mean that, on matters
of law and policy, an ALJ is subordinate to the agency in which he or she
serves.24 The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress intended to
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 218 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations
omitted). See also Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 n.17
(D.C. Cir. 1974) ("The Attorney General's Manual is entitled to considerable weight
because of the very active role that the Attorney General played in the formulation and
enactment of the APA.").
19 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2000).
20 
"Agency" is defined under the APA as "each authority of the Government of the United
States." 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2000). Legislative history reveals that -[a]uthority' means any
officer or board, whether within another agency or not. [sic] which by law ha.- [sic] authority
to take final and binding action with or without appeal to some superior administrative
authority." ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 18, at 9. As the Administrator is
exclusively authorized by Congress to assess civil penalties for violations of the federal
environmental statutes, the Administrator is the "authority of the Government of the
United States," and, therefore, the agency as identified in the APA. In other statutes a
Board or Commission or Secretary might be the agency. Id.
21 5 U.S.C. § 554(b) (2000).
22 Id. § 554(c).
2 Id. § 556(c).
' The Attorney General of the United States has stated that "[tihe phrase 'subject to the
published rules of the agency' is intended to make clear the authority of the agency to lay
down policies and procedural rules which will govern the exercise of such powers by presid-
ing officers." ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 18, at 75. In addition, the federal
courts consistently have recognized that, on matters of law and policy, ALJs are subor-
dinate to the agency in which they serve. See, e.g., Croplife Am. v. EPA, 329 F.3d 876, 882
(D.C. Cir. 2003) ("[Tihe reality of agency operations makes it clear that ALJs cannot inde-
pendently rule on the legality of third-party human studies, because they may not ignore
the Administrator's unequivocal statement prohibiting the agency from considering such
studies."); Iran Air v. Kugelman, 996 F.2d 1253, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("It is commonly
recognized that ALJs 'are entirely subject to the agency on matters of law.'"); Mullen v.
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make ALJs "semi-independent subordinate hearing officers," and that an
ALJ "is a creature of Congressional enactment."
25
Congress authorized an ALJ only to "initially" decide a case, and "on
appeal from or review of the initial decision the agency has all the powers
which it would have in making the initial decision," with exceptions not
relevant to this discussion.26 In this regard, the Supreme Court noted that
where Congress places decision-making authority in a Board, "[tihe respon-
sibility for decision thus placed on the Board is wholly inconsistent with the
notion that it has power to reverse an examiner's findings only when they
are 'clearly erroneous.' Such a limitation would make so drastic a departure
from prior administrative practice that explicitness would be required."27
The Attorney General of the United States explained that an initial
decision is advisory in nature, and that "[iun making its decision, whether
following an initial or recommended decision, the agency is in no way bound
by the decision of its subordinate officer; it retains complete freedom of
decision-as though it had heard the evidence itself."28
Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 540-541 n.5 (6th Cir. 1986) ("There are, however, definite limits
on the extent to which A_'s [sic] may exercise their decisional independence. Indeed,
were it otherwise it might be difficult for the agency to implement its policies," therefore,
ALJs "remain entirely subject to the agency on matters of law and policy."); D'Amico v.
Schweiker, 698 F.2d 903,905-06 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that ALJs must comply with an
"instruction" issued by the Chief Administrative Law Judge of the agency announcing
"new policy," even though the instruction "truncated" AU discretion, and A.Js believed
the instruction injured social security claimants); Ass'n of Admin. Law Judges, Inc. v.
Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1141 (D.D.C. 1984) (stating that an AI "must 'scrupulously
and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all the relevant facts," but "[oln
matters of law and policy, however, ALJs are entirely subject to the agency.").
25 Ramspeck v. Fed. Trial Exam'rs Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 132-33 (1953). The terms
"hearing officer" and "trial examiner" and "AlU" all refer to the same governmental officer.
In 1978 amendments to the APA, Congress provided that hearing examiners shall be
known as administrative law judges. Act of March 27, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-251,92 Stat.
183. Notwithstanding the name change, no amendment was made to the Administrative
Procedure Act effecting the authority of this particular governmental officer. See 5 U.S.C.
§§ 556-557 (2000); see also KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMiNISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 17.11
(2nd ed. 1980) (describing the historical development of the position).
26 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2000).
27 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,492 (1951). See also FCC v. Allentown
Broad. Corp., 349 U.S. 358, 364 (1955) (rejecting an appellate court's holding that findings
of an AU based on witness demeanor are not to be overruled by an agency's final decision-
making authority "without a 'very substantial preponderance in the testimony as recorded,-
as such a holding was tantamount to a "clearly erroneous" standard which does not apply
to an agency's review of an AUJ's initial decisions).2 8 ATToRNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL supra, note 18, at 83. Federal courts have interpreted
this statutory provision likewise. It has been recognized that Universal Camera makes clear
[Vol. 32:57
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Finally, Congress has established criteria which all final agency
action-including final decisions of the Administrator assessing civil
penalties-must meet to conform with the law and be upheld on judicial
review, providing that "[a sanction may not be imposed or rule or order
issued except on consideration of the whole record or those parts thereof
cited by a party and supported by and in accordance with the reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence."29 Congress further provides that, on
judicial review, final decisionmaking of an agency shall be held "unlawful
and set aside" if its findings and conclusions are found to be "arbitrary, ca-
pricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."'
that"the ultimate responsibility for findings of fact rests with the National Labor Relations
Board by statute, as we believe it rests with the Secretary of Health and Human Services
here, and for the same reasons."Mullen, 800 F.2d at 542. "Under administrative law prin-
ciples, an agency or board is free either to adopt or reject an AW's findings and conclusions
of law." Starrett v. Special Counsel, 792 F.2d 1246, 1252 (4th Cir. 1986). "[Als the Supreme
Court made clear in Universal Camera, the agency is free to substitute its judgment for
that of the AIU," and "the ALJ's determinations are not entitled to any special deference
from the agency except insofar as the AL,'s findings are based on witness credibility
determinations." Mattes v. United States, 721 F.2d 1125, 1129 (7th Cir. 1983). "[T]he fact
that the Board reached different factual conclusions that [sic] the administrative law judge
is not as diabolic as respondent suggests," the issue "is whether the Board's decision is
based on substantial evidence." U.S. Soil Conditioning v. NLRB, 606 F.2d 940,942 (10th
Cir. 1979). "Section 8(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 557(b), clearly
authorizes the agency to 'make any findings or conclusions which in its judgment are
proper on the record,' notwithstanding a different determination by the Examiner [AIU]."
Fink v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n, 417 F.2d 1058, 1059 (2d Cir. 1969).
29 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2000).
30 Id. § 706. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has held that:
The function of the court is to assure that the agency has given reasoned
consideration to all the material facts and issues. This calls for insis-
tence that the agency articulate with reasonable clarity its reasons for
decision, and identify the significance of the crucial facts, a course that
tends to assure that the agency's policies effectuate general standards,
applied without unreasonable discrimination.
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (citations
omitted). The Court emphasized that it has maintained a "rigorous insistence on the need
for conjunction of articulated standards and reflective findings, in furtherance of even-
handed application of law, rather than impermissible whim, improper influence, or mis-
placed zeal." Id. at 852. The Court observed that "in the last analysis it is the agency's
function, not the Examiner's, to make the findings of fact and select the ultimate decision,
and where there is evidence supporting each result it is the agency's choice that governs."
Id. at 853. In addressing the "even handed application of law" in administrative adjudi-
cation, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, citing J. MASHAW ET AL., SOCIAL SECURITY
HEARINGS AND APPEALS: A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION HEARING
SYSTEM 19 (1978), recognized that:
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II. THE ADMINISTRATOR'S PROMULGATED RULES
The Supreme Court recognized that "[t]he power of an administra-
tive agency to administer a congressionally created... program necessarily
requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap
left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress."3 1
The Administrator promulgated the "Consolidated Rules of Practice
Governing the Administrative Assessment of Civil Penalties, Issuance
of Compliance or Corrective Orders, and the Revocation, Termination or
Suspension of Permits" (the "Administrator's Rules"), which are codified
at 40 C.F.R. part 22.32 These rules were first promulgated in 1980,"' and
more recently amended.34 In the public notice proposing the amended rules,
the Administrator noted that amendments were necessary to "correct a
number of inconsistencies and ambiguities in the procedures which have
become apparent through experience" with the original rules, which "were
promulgated in 1980 to establish uniform procedural rules for adminis-
trative enforcement proceedings required under various environmental
statutes to be held on the record after opportunity for a hearing in accor-
dance with section 554 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. et
seq. "35 The rules "govern all administrative adjudicatory proceedings for...
[tihe assessment of any civil administrative penalty" under various federal
environmental statutes in which Congress has invested the Administrator
with authority to assess civil penalties for violations, those statutes being
specifically identified in the rules.36
Perhaps no characteristic of a procedural system is so uniformly denounced as
a tendency to produce inconsistent results. When disposition depends more on
which judge is assigned to the case than on the facts or the legal rules, the ten-
dency is to describe the system as lawless, arbitrary, or the like, even though the
case assignment is random.
Santise v. Schweiker, 676 F.2d 925, 930 (3rd Cir. 1982).
" Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
32 40 C.F.R. pt. 22 (1999).
3 Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing the Administrative Assessment of Civil
Penalties and the Revocation or Suspension of Permits, 45 Fed. Reg. 24,360 (Apr. 9, 1980)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 22, 80, 168, 226).
34 Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing the Administrative Assessment of Civil
Penalties, 64 Fed. Reg. 40,138 (July 23, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 22).
31 Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing the Administrative Assessment of Civil
Penalties, 63 Fed. Reg. 9464 (Feb. 25, 1998) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 22, 59).
36 40 C.F.R. § 22.1 (2006).
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By rule, the notice of proposed penalty order and of opportunity for
hearing, which the Administrator is required by the federal environmental
statutes to provide to alleged violators prior to assessing any civil penalty
against them, is identified by the Administrator as a "complaint."37 His
rules provide that a "complainant"-meaning "any person authorized to
issue a complaint,"38 may issue a complaint which meets the requirements
of 40 C.F.R. section 22.14." Those requirements include that the complaint:
* identify statutory provisions "authorizing the issu-
ance of the complaint;"
0 identify statutory and regulatory provisions which
are "alleged to be violated;"
* include a "concise statement of the factual basis for
each violation alleged[;I" and,
at the discretion of the Administrator's delegated
complainant, identify the amount of civil penalty
proposed.4 °
The complaint also must advise the alleged violator that he or she has a
"right to request a hearing on any material fact alleged in the complaint,
or on the appropriateness of any proposed penalty," 1 and a copy of the
Administrator's Rules must be provided to the alleged violator along with
a copy of the complaint.42
When the alleged violator intends to contest "any material fact upon
which the complaint is based," or if he or she "contends that the proposed
penalty... is inappropriate," the alleged violator must respond to the
complaint with "a written answer to the complaint." 3 In the answer, a
respondent must "clearly and directly admit, deny or explain each of the
factual allegations contained in the complaint," or, if the respondent is
without knowledge and unable to answer, to so state.44 The respondent
also must state in the answer "[t] he circumstances or arguments which
are alleged to constitute the grounds of any defense; the facts which
37 Id. § 22.13.
38 Id. § 22.3(a)(2).
39 Id. § 22.14(a).
40 Id. § 22.14(a)(1)-(4).
41 Id. § 22.14(a)(5).
42 Id. § 22.14(b).
' Id. § 22.15(a).
4Id. § 22.15(b).
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respondent disputes; the basis for opposing any proposed relief; and
whether a hearing is requested." 5 The Administrator provides that "failure
of the respondent to admit, deny, or explain any material factual allegation
contained in the complaint constitutes an admission of the allegation"46
and that "[a] hearing upon the issues raised by the complaint and answer
may be held if requested."47
The Administrator provides for a pre-hearing process, including
discovery and summary disposition, the latter identified as "accelerated
decision."48 The Administrator also provides specific rules applicable to
the conduct of the hearing49 and requires initial decisions to be issued by
the AL presiding in the case.
50
The Administrator provides for review of "initial" decisions by the
Board, either on appeal from a party or on the Board's own initiative.5' In
those instances where the initial decision is not appealed to the Board, or
otherwise selected by the Board itself for review, by rule, the initial decision
of the ALJ becomes the final decision of the Administrator "45 days after
its service upon the parties."52 If the initial decision is reviewed by the
Board, the Administrator has provided, without restriction, that the Board
"shall adopt, modify, or set aside the findings of fact and conclusions of law
or discretion contained in the decision or order being reviewed, and shall
set forth in the final order the reasons for its actions." 3
In the preamble of his latest promulgation of the rules, the
Administrator stated that
[t] he EAB is responsible for assuring consistency in Agency
adjudications by all of the ALJs and RJOs [Regional Judicial
Officers]. The appeal process of the [Administrator's Rules]
gives the Agency an opportunity to correct erroneous deci-
sions before they are appealed to the federal courts. The
EAB assures that final decisions represent with [sic] the
position of the Agency as a whole, rather than just the
45/d.
46Id. § 22.15(d).
47 Id. § 22.15(c).
4Id. §§ 22.16, 22.19, 22.20.
49Id. §§ 22.21-22.26.
50 Id. § 22.27.
5, Id. §§ 22.29-22.30.52 Id. § 22.27(c).
53 1d. § 22.30(f).
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position of one Region, one enforcement office, or one
Presiding Officer.54
III. FINAL DECISIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATOR
This Part examines the final decisionmaking of the Board, conducted
on behalf of the Administrator. It will first review decisions of the Board
relating to the penalty amount for adjudicated violations. Then it will
review the Board's decisions relating to procedural matters such as
summary decisionmaking, discovery and the admission of evidence.
A. Determination of an Appropriate Penalty Amount
The Administrator provides that, after hearing or on motion for
an accelerated decision, an AJ must determine an appropriate amount
of penalty in an initial decision.5 As an AI is subordinate to the Admin-
istrator,56 and an initial decision of an ALJ may become a final decision
of the Administrator for which the Administrator is responsible, the
Administrator provides the following guidance to the ALJs:
The Presiding Officer [an ALJ] shall consider any civil
penalty guidelines issued under the Act [violated]. The
Presiding Officer shall explain in detail in the initial decision
how the penalty to be assessed corresponds to any penalty
criteria set forth in the Act. If the Presiding Officer decides
to assess a penalty different in amount from the penalty pro-
posed by complainant, the Presiding Officer shall set forth
in the initial decision the specific reasons for the increase
or decrease. 8
1. The Administrator's Civil Penalty Guidelines
Under the federal environmental statutes, Congress authorizes
the Administrator to assess penalty amounts for a violation, or day of
' Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing the Administrative Assessment of Civil
Penalties, 64 Fed. Reg. 40,138, 40,165 (July 23, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 22).55 Id. § 22.27(b).
56 5 U.S.C. § 556(c) (2000).
5' 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2000); 40 C.F.R. § 22.27(c).
5"8 40 C.F.R. § 22.27(b).
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violation, anywhere from $1 to as much as $10,000 or $25,000."9 In these
statutes, Congress provides no guidance as to how the Administrator is
to determine specific amounts of penalty for specific violations other than
to identify narrative criteria that the Administrator must take into con-
sideration. Given the wide range of authorized penalty amounts, how the
statutory penalty criteria are interpreted and applied to the evidence of a
particular case can have an enormous influence on whether the penalty
amount chosen for a particular violation will be closer to $1 or to $25,000.
In Butz v. Glover Livestock Commission Co., the Supreme Court
recognized a "fundamental principle" that "where Congress has entrusted
an administrative agency with the responsibility of selecting the means
of achieving the statutory policy 'the relation of remedy to policy is pecu-
liarly a matter for administrative competence."'60 Consequently, "[tihe
fashioning of an appropriate and reasonable remedy is for the Secretary
[of Agriculture], not the court," and, on judicial review, "[tihe court may
decide only whether, under the pertinent statute and relevant facts, the
Secretary made 'an allowable judgment in his choice of the remedy.'"61
A corollary to the recognition of agency discretion is this:
[o]ne of the fundamental justifications for the administra-
tive process is that an agency possesses an expertise in a
particular subject area that the judiciary, as it is presently
structured, cannot acquire at an acceptable cost. Thatjusti-
fication does not come into play in a particular case unless
the agency has in fact applied its expertise.62
Just as Congress entrusted the Secretary of Agriculture with
selecting the means of achieving the statutory policy of the Packers and
Stockyards Act63 at issue in Butz, Congress entrusted the Administrator
with selecting the means of achieving the statutory policy of the federal
environmental laws,' utilizing the expertise made available to him in his
agency. Consequently, the fashioning of an appropriate remedy, such as
59 See, e.g., CAA § 113(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d) (2000); CWA § 309(g)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(2)
(2000); TSCA § 15(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. §2615(a)(1) (2000); SWDA § 3008(a)(3), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6928(a)(3) (2000); EPCRA § 325, 42 U.S.C. § 11045 (2000).
60 Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm'n Co., 411 U.S. 182, 185 (1973).
61 Id. at 188-89.
62 Brock v. Dow Chem. U.S.A., 801 F.2d 926, 932 (7th Cir. 1986).
Glover Livestock Comm'n, 411 U.S. at 188-89.
See supra Part I.B. 1 (describing Congressional authority vested in the Administrator).
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determining penalty amounts for violations of a federal environmental
statute, is a matter of the Administrator's discretion.65
The Administrator, pursuant to his authority as Chief Executive
Officer, organized the agency. One of the "[nline operational offices, each
headed by an Assistant Administrator responsible for carrying out EPA's
major environmental and administrative programs,"" is the Office of
Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring. 7 "Under the supervision of"
the Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring,
this office
serves as the principal adviser to the Administrator in
matters concerning enforcement and compliance; and
provides the principal direction and review of civil enforce-
ment activities for air, water, waste, pesticides, toxics, and
radiation. The Assistant Administrator [for Enforcement
and Compliance Monitoring] reviews the efforts of each
Assistant and Regional Administrator to assure that EPA
develops and conducts a strong and consistent enforcement
and compliance monitoring program. The Office manages
the national criminal enforcement program; ensures co-
ordination of media office administrative compliance pro-
grams, and civil and criminal enforcement activities; and
provides technical expertise for enforcement activities.6"
This delegation of authority is long-standing.69
65 See Panhandle Coop. Ass'n v. EPA, 771 F.2d 1149, 1152 (8th Cir. 1985) ("The assessment
of a penalty is particularly delegated to the administrative agency. Its choice of sanction
is not to be overturned unless 'it is unwarranted in law' or'without justification in fact.");
see also Robinson v. United States, 718 F.2d 336, 339 (10th Cir. 1983) ("once the agency
determines that a violation has been committed, the sanctions to be imposed are a matter
of agency policy and discretion.").
66 40 C.F.R. § 1.21 (2006).67 Id. § 1.35.
68 Id.
" In announcing an update, the Administrator delegated on June 30, 1978 to his Assistant
Administrator for Enforcement the task of "serv[ing] as the principal adviser to the
Administrator in matters pertaining to the enforcement of standards for environmental
quality, and [being] responsible for the conduct of enforcement activities on an agencywide
[sic] basis." 43 Fed. Reg. 28,479, 28482 (June 30, 1978) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1.31). This
title was later expanded to Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance
Monitoring. See 49 Fed. Reg. 26,727,26,730 (June 29, 1984). In addition to being the "prin-
cipal adviser to the Administrator in matters concerning enforcement and compliance,"
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On February 16,1984, the Assistant Administrator for Enforcement
and Compliance Monitoring ("Assistant Administrator"), on behalf of the
Administrator, issued general policy documents regarding the determi-
nation of appropriate civil penalty amounts in the Administrator's civil
penalty assessment process.7 ° These documents were published in an effort
to assure that the process resulted in assessed penalties meeting designated
goals of "deterrence, fair and equitable treatment of the regulated com-
munity, and swift resolution of environmental problems."71 The Assistant
Administrator directed that each division of the Agency issue program-
specific penalty policies, based upon Agency-wide framework principals
being announced that day.72 Policy GM-21 directs that
[iun order to achieve the above Agency policy goals, all
administratively imposed penalties and settlements of civil
penalty actions should, where possible, be consistent with
the guidance contained in the Framework document. Devi-
ations from the Framework's methodology, where merited,
are authorized as long as the reasons for the deviations
are documented.73
The "consistent application of a penalty policy" was found important
"because otherwise the resulting penalties might be seen as being arbi-
trarily assessed. Thus violators would be more inclined to litigate over
those penalties. This would consume Agency resources and make swift
resolution of environmental problems less likely."
74
The Administrator's general policy and framework document also
recognized that "[t] reating similar situations in a similar fashion is central
to the credibility of EPA's enforcement effort and to the success of achieving
the goal of equitable treatment."
75
this Assistant Administrator was also to "review[] the efforts of each Assistant and
Regional Administrator to assure that EPA develops and conducts a strong and consistent
enforcement and compliance monitoring program." Id.
7o U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, POLICY ON CIVIL PENALTIES: EPA GEN. ENFORCEMENT POLICY
#GM-21 (1984) [hereinafter POLICY GM-21]; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, A FRAMEwORK
FOR STATUTE-SPECIFIC APPROACHES TO PENALTY ASSESSMENTS: IMPLEMENTING EPA's
POLICY ON CIVIL PENALTIES, EPA GEN. ENFORCEMENT POLICY #GM-22 (1984) [hereinafter
POLICY GM-22].
71 POLICY GM-21, supra note 70, at 1; POLICY GM-22, supra note 70, at 1.
72 POLICY GM-21, supra note 70, at 1; POLICY GM-22, supra note 70, at 1.
73 POLICY GM-21, supra note 70, at 1.74 Id. at4.
75 POLICY GM-22, supra note 70, at 27.
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While each of the Administrator's statute-specific policies address
the penalty criteria of the particular statute involved, the policies generally
provide for a two step process in which evidence is evaluated in consid-
eration of the statutory penalty criteria. The first step is the determination
of a preliminary deterrence amount, which involves an "economic benefit"
component and a "gravity of harm" component.76 The "economic benefit"
component consists of determining the dollar amount by which the violator
was enriched as a consequence of his violating conduct, based upon the
evidence in the case.17 A dollar amount representing the gravity of the vio-
lation is then added, which incorporates a consideration of such things
as the amount and toxicity of the pollutant involved; the actual harm, or
potential for harm, presented by the violating conduct; the sensitivity of
the ambient environment; the duration of the violation; and the threat to
the regulatory scheme presented by the violating conduct. 7' To assist in
the gravity determination, a matrix is often provided, with dollar amounts
on the matrix ranging from low to high, representing various degrees of
harm as disclosed by the evidence in the case. Once the preliminary deter-
rence amount is determined, that amount will be raised or lowered, based
upon a consideration of the evidence in the case relating to such statutory
criteria as the violator's culpability; ability to pay a particular penalty
amount; history of prior violations; and other factors as justice may require
specific to the case.79
2. An Analysis of the Administrator's Final Penalty Determinations
as Issued by the Board, in Consideration of the Language of
the Federal Environmental Statutes, the APA, and the
Administrator's Rules
Although the Board has acknowledged that the Administrator's
regulations "grant the Board de novo review of a penalty determination" °
in an ALJ's initial decision, without any consideration of the language
of Congress in the federal environmental statutes and in sections 556(c),
557(b) and 706 of the APA, "the Board has many times stated that it will
generally not substitute its judgment for that of an AI absent a showing
76 Id. at 2.
7 Id. at 6-12.
78 Id. at 13-15.
79 Id. at 16-24.
" In re CDT Landfill Corp., 11 E.A.D. 88, 117 (2003).
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that the ALJ committed clear error or an abuse of discretion in assessing
a penalty.""'
The Board has recognized an AL's independence from the Admin-
istrator's policies when determining penalty amounts, stating that an A.'s
obligation under 40 C.F.R. § 22.27(b) to consider a particular penalty
policy adopted by the Administrator
carries with it no obligation to adhere to the penalty policy
in a particular instance. Nor does it suggest that a presiding
officer errs in the slightest respect if he or she decides not
to deviate from the penalty policy. The fact that the presid-
ing officer has a choice of either following or deviating from
the [p] enalty [p] olicy operates to preserve not restrict the
presiding officer's independence.8 2
Five years later, the Board stated "as we have made clear in many prior
decisions, once a presiding officer considers the relevant penalty policy,
he or she may adopt the penalty computed in accordance with that policy
or deviate therefrom, so long as the penalty assessed reflects the criteria
in the applicable statute."
83
" In re CDT Landfill Corporation, 11 E.A.D. at 117. A word must be said about termi-
nology. An ALJ is not authorized by Congress in any federal environmental statute to
.assess" a civil penalty; only the Administrator is invested with that authority. See supra
Part I.B.1. The Supreme Court has noted that "[olur precedents make clear that the
starting point for our analysis is the statutory text. And where, as here, the words of the
statute are unambiguous, the 'judicial inquiry is complete.'" Desert Palace, Inc., v. Costa,
539 U.S. 90, 98 (2003) (citations omitted). Moreover, "[a] fundamental canon of statutory
construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their
ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37,42 (1979).
As the Administrator is one specifically designated Chief Executive Officer of a federal
agency, the words "the Administrator" appearing in the several federal environmental
statutes cannot be interpreted, consistent with sound principles of statutory interpretation,
to include each of several ALJs who are "creature [s] of congressional enactment" and "semi-
independent subordinate hearing officers." Ramspeck v. Fed. Trial Exam'rs Conference,
345 U.S. 128, 132-33 (1953). Moreover, in the relevant "Congressional enactment,"
Section 557(b) of the APA, Congress authorizes an ALl to do no more than "initially"
decide a matter. And, in conformance with that section, the Administrator has invested
ALJs with authority only to initially decide a matter. 40 C.F.R. § 22.17 (2006). Conse-
quently, the notion that an AU "assesses" or is "assessing" a penalty is inaccurate.
"2 In re DIC Americas, Inc., 6 E.A.D. 184, 190-91 (1995) (citation omitted).
13 In re Rogers Corp., 9 E.A.D. 534, 569 (2000).
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The "Board has repeatedly stated that a Presiding Officer, having
considered any applicable civil penalty guidelines issued by the Agency,
is nonetheless free not to apply them to the case at hand," 4 and observed
that an ALJ, in determining a penalty amount in an initial decision,
could simply have considered the [p] enalty [p] olicy's ana-
lytical framework and concluded that, in this particular
case, application of the TSCA § 16 criteria in the manner
suggested by the [p]enalty [p]olicy did not yield an 'appro-
priate' penalty. The ALJ could likewise have rejected an
'appropriate' penalty generated in accordance with the
Penalty Policy, in favor of another 'appropriate' penalty
better suited to the circumstances of this particular case. 5
Moreover, the Board has stated "it also should be clear that subsumed
within the ALJ's authority to assess a penalty different than one calcu-
lated under Agency guidance is the notion that Agency guidance does not
limit the ALJ's authority to assess a penalty that is otherwise in accor-
dance with the statutory factors." 6
From its decisionmaking, it would appear that the Board has
failed to heed the admonishment of Justice Frankfurter and, indeed, has
"read the laws of Congress through the distorting lenses of inapplicable
legal doctrine."" The Board does not analyze its role, and that of an ALJ, in
consideration of the language of the laws of Congress which govern the
Administrator's penalty assessment process, those laws being the federal
environmental statutes and the APA."8 Instead, the Board has adopted
appellate review principles of the judicial process, ruling as if the AIU was
an independent trial judge assessing penalty amounts, and, in its review
of an A1J's decision, the Board, like an appellate court, is to give deference
to the ALJ's penalty assessment. As we shall see, this is a problem. In de-
ferring decisionmaking to each of several ALJs, rather than acting as the
delegated authority responsible for the content of the Administrator's final
decisions, the Board has adopted a posture on review which is not in accor-
dance with law. Moreover, as a consequence of deferring decisionmaking
4 In re Employers Ins. of Wausau & Group Eight Tech., Inc., 6 E.A.D. 735, 758 (1997).
8 5Id. at 759.
6In re U.S. Army, Fort Wainwright Cent. Heating & Power Plant, 11 EA.D. 126, 172 (2003).
87 FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 144 (1940).
tm See supra Part I.B.
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to each of several ALJs, the Board has issued final decisions on behalf
of the Administrator that are arbitrary and capricious.
a. Review Standards of the Board are not in Accordance with Law
Given the law and the Administrator's Rules and delegation, the
Board itself is responsible for assessing civil penalties and determining the
amount of those penalties in final decisions of the Administrator, not each
of the several ALJs. The Supreme Court has reviewed rules promulgated
by the Attorney General under the Immigration Act of 1917, in which the
Attorney General delegated his final decision-making authority to a Board
of Immigration Appeals. The Court held that "the Board was required, as
it still is, to exercise its own judgment when considering appeals," and that,
"if the word 'discretion' means anything in a statutory or administrative
grant of power, it means that the recipient must exercise his authority
according to his own understanding and conscience."89
As we have seen, the Administrator has created a unified Board,
delegating to that Board his authority to issue final decisions assessing
civil penalties.9 ° Recognizing his obligations under the federal environ-
mental statutes and the APA,9  the Administrator publicly announced that
the Board "is responsible for assuring consistency in Agency adjudications
by all of the ALJs and RJOs," and that it is "to correct erroneous decisions
before they are appealed to the federal courts" and assure "that final deci-
sions represent with [sic] the position of the Agency as a whole, rather than
just the position of one Region, one enforcement office, or one Presiding
Officer."92 Toward that end, by rule, the Administrator provides, without
restriction, that the Board "shall adopt, modify, or set aside the findings
" U. S. ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260,266-67 (1954). The procedure under
review here "called for decisions at three separate administrative levels below the Attorney
General-hearing officer, Commissioner, and the Board of Immigration Appeals." Id. at 266.
Regarding the Board, the regulations provided that "[i]n considering and determining...
appeals, the Board of Immigration Appeals shall exercise such discretion and power con-
ferred upon the Attorney General by law as is appropriate and necessary for the disposition
of the case." Id. The decision of the Board was final except in certain delineated circum-
stances set out in the rules. Id.
o Changes to Regulations to Reflect the Role of the New Environmental Appeals Board
in Agency Adjudications, 57 Fed. Reg. 5320 (Feb. 13, 1992) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 1, 3,
17, 22, 27, 57, 60, 66, 85, 86, 114, 123, 124, 164, 209, 222, 223, 233, 403).
9' See supra Part I.B.
92 Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing the Administrative Assessment of Civil
Penalties, 64 Fed. Reg. 40,138, 40,165 (July 23, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 22).
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of fact and conclusions of law or discretion contained in the [initial] decision
or order being reviewed, and shall set forth in the final order the reasons
for its actions."3 Like the rules of the Attorney General reviewed inAccardi,
the clear import of the language of the Administrator in his rules, and their
preamble, is that the Board is required "to exercise its own judgment when
considering appeals,"94 and not to defer to the judgment of whichever one
of several ALJs authored the initial decision.95
Moreover, an ALU is not "the agency." Federal courts interpret an
AL's decisionmaking as subject to the law and policy of the agency, i.e., the
Administrator.97 As, by law, an ALJ in making an initial decision is sub-
ordinate to the Administrator on matters of law and policy, and the law
recognizes that a penalty amount determination is an exercise of agency
discretion involving matters of law and policy,9" it would appear that the
law is contrary to the Board's position that each AW independently deter-
mines penalty amounts, and its inclination to defer to the discretion of each
of several ALJs in determining appropriate penalty amounts for the
Administrator to assess for violations of the federal environmental statutes.
In this regard, two characteristics of a penalty determination also
must be noted. First, "[tihe assessment [of a penalty] is not a factual finding
but the exercise of a discretionary grant of power."99 The Administrator,
93 40 C.F.R. § 22.30(f) (2006) (emphasis added).94 Accardi, 347 U.S. at 266-67.
95 In a 1987 final decision, the Administrator's CJO recognized that "[tihe Administrator
has the responsibility for making final agency decisions," citing, in part, to Professor
Kenneth C. Davis's description of the case law on the relationship between the AUJ and
the agency:
The final distillation (of present case law) is that the primary factfinder
is the agency, not the AJ; that the agency retains 'the power of ruling
on facts .... [iun the first instance'; that the agency still has 'all the
powers which it would have in making the initial, [sic] decision', that
the AIJ is a subordinate whose findings do not have the weight of the
findings of a district judge; that the relation between the AW and agency
is not the same as or even closely similar to the relation between agency
and reviewing court; and that the AI.'s findings are nevertheless to be
taken into account by the reviewing court and given special weight when
they depend upon demeanor of witnesses.
In re Martin Elecs., Inc., 2 E.A.D. 381, 394-95 (1987) (citing 3 KENNETH CULP DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 17:16 (2d ed. 1980)).
96 See supra note 20 (discussing the definition of "Agency").
97 See supra note 24 (discussing the interpretation of the Administrative Procedure Act).98 See supra note 65 and Part III(A)(2).
" Panhandle Coop. Ass'n v. EPA, 771 F.2d. 1149, 1152 (8th Cir. 1985).
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through his CJO, has explained that although the quantity of a particular
chemical may be a factual issue bearing on the appropriateness of a pen-
alty, as may be the "ability of the company to continue doing business,"
whether the policy should impose a separate penalty for each chemical not
reported, or whether an appropriate penalty dollar amount was selected for
each box of the policy matrix "is a legal or policy issue."' ° Consequently,
as a penalty amount determination is not an issue of fact, it is not a deter-
mination to be established by witness testimony, and deference to an A's
penalty amount determination cannot be warranted on grounds that he
alone had an opportunity to observe witness demeanor.' 01
Second, although one of the fundamental justifications forjudicial
deference to the administrative process is that an agency "possesses an
expertise in a particular subject area" that judges do not have, "[tihat
justification does not come into play in a particular case unless the agency
has in fact applied its expertise."12 The Assistant Administrator, to whom
the Administrator has directly delegated his policy-making authority, can
draw upon the historical experience and technical expertise of the Adminis-
trator's entire agency in formulating and issuing the Administrator's policy.
In contrast, an ALJ, by law, is restricted in making his initial decision to
the administrative record in the case before him. o' One AI.J cannot match
the agency's collective training, historical experience, and expertise in evalu-
ating environmental risks and environmental harm.' Consequently, an
ALJ's pronouncements and judgments regarding policy and discretion
on such matters are suspect when at odds with the Administrator's own
issued policy statements, and to the extent that a penalty determination
is informed by an AlJ's personal policy choices and not those of the Admin-
istrator, a reviewing court cannot find that "the agency has in fact applied
its expertise."'15
1°°In re Chautauqua Hardware Corporation, 3 E.A.D. 616, 623 (1991).
101 See River Forest Pharmacy, Inc. v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 501 F.2d 1202, 1206
(7th Cir. 1974) (witness credibility and demeanor "are irrelevant to an assessment of the
seriousness of petitioner's violations and of the sanction most appropriate for the promotion
of agency policy regarding them.").
102 Brock v. Dow Chem. U.S.A., 801 F.2d. 926, 932 (7th Cir. 1986).
103 5 U.S.C. § 556(d)-(e).
"o, See Accelerated Decision, In re U.S. Army, Fort Wainwright Cent. Heating & Power
Plant, U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency No. CAA-10-99-0121, 7, n.5 (Apr. 30,2002) ("none of EPA's
current ALJs worked for the Agency or any state environmental entity prior to their
judicial appointment").
"o5 Dow Chem. U.S.A., 801 F.2d. at 932.
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It must be emphasized that the Administrator's penalty policies
are not separate and apart from the penalty criteria of the subject statute;
the policies are interpretations of the statutory penalty criteria, and they
incorporate penalty calculation methodologies based upon those interpre-
tations. The interpretations and methodologies in these policies are those
of the Administrator, the Chief Executive Officer of EPA in whom Congress
has specifically and exclusively invested authority to assess, and to deter-
mine the amount of, civil penalties for violations of the federal environ-
mental statutes. 106 These interpretations and methodologies are formulated
and issued by the senior officers to whom the Administrator has specifi-
cally delegated his policy-making authority in enforcement matters. °7
Moreover, these penalty policies do not require that a specific
penalty amount be determined appropriate for any particular violation
of any particular violator. Before any penalty amount can be determined
appropriate, there must be an analysis of the evidence in the record relating
to a specific violation and a specific violator, applying the statutory criteria
as interpreted in the various premises of the policy. The policies explicitly
allow for "[d]eviations from the [policy's framework], where merited," so
long as "the reasons for the deviations are documented."' It is one thing,
however, for a penalty amount determination in a final decision to deviate
from a premise in the Administrator's penalty policy framework regarding
a particular penalty criteria-for instance, where it does not appear that
the evidence in a particular case has been contemplated by the policy-
while applying the remainder of the policy. It is something far different
when the Board adopts an initial decision of an ALJ as a final decision of
the Administrator, holding that the AL has the discretion to reject "an
'appropriate' penalty generated in accordance with the [p] enalty [p] olicy"
if the AIJ personally finds a different amount of penalty than that yielded
by the Administrator's policy "better suited to the circumstances of the
particular case."109 It is something far different when, as we shall see,
o6 See supra notes 12-16 (discussing the statutory delegation of Congressional authority
to the Administrator under various statutes).
'
0
' See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text (discussing Administrator's delegation
of authority to the Board); see also In re Bell & Howell Co., 1 E.A.D. 811, 817 n.6 (1983)
("the penalty guidelines constitute an interpretation of the statutory factors set forth in
TSCA § 16(a)(2)" and "he Administrator... has specifically directed the presiding officer
in § 22.27(b) of the procedural rules to give that interpretation consideration.").
'08 POLICY GM-21, supra note 70, at 1.
"' In re Employers Ins. of Wausau & Group Eight Tech., Inc., 6 E.A.D. 735, 759 (1997).
The ruling of the Board in In re Employers Insurance of Wausau and Group Eight
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the Board adopts in a final decision of the Administrator an independent
penalty determination of an AL_, finding that the ALJ was within his dis-
cretion in rejecting the Administrator's policy as arbitrary and unauthorized
by statute. It is also far different when the Board adopts, in a final decision
of the Administrator, a penalty determination of an AJ, even though the
Al in making the determination simply ignored the Administrator's policy
without comment. 110
Technology, Inc. warrants closer scrutiny, as it is emblematic of the confusion which has
plagued the Administrator's penalty assessment process. If"an'appropriate' penalty gen-
erated in accordance with the [plenalty [p]olicy" is before the ALJ, as here contemplated
by the Board, by what authority does the Board find that the AW has the discretion to
reject that penalty amount for a penalty amount that the AU personally finds "better
suited to the circumstances of the particular case[?]"Id. Given that the penalty policy from
which the rejected penalty amount was generated was the Administrator's policy, is such
a holding not at odds with the statute itself, in this case TSCA, in which Congress makes
clear that it is the Administrator, and not anyone else, who is to determine the penalty
amount? In recognizing that a presiding AU can pick a penalty amount which he person-
ally finds "better suited to the circumstances of the particular case" than one generated
by use of the Administrator's policy, is the Board's holding not at odds with section 557(b)
of the APA, in which Congress invests ALJs with authority only to issue initial decisions,
making the agency responsible for the contents of final decisions?
110 The Administrator's penalty policies, and his intended use of the policies, stand in
marked contrast to the Federal Communications Commission's ("FCC") penalty guidelines
found to be promulgated unlawfully. See U.S. Telephone Ass'n v. FCC, 28 F.3d 1232 (D.C.
Cir. 1994). In 1991, the FCC decided to "abandon its traditional case-by-case approach to
implementing section 503(b)" of the Federal Communications Act ("FCA"), and issued
specific standards for assessing fines. Id. at 1233. The Court found that penalty amounts
assessed by the FCC in all but eight of over 300 cases were automatically determined under
the standards, based upon nothing more than the name of the violation found to have been
committed and which category the violator fell within. Id. at 1233-34. The Court struck
down the standards, finding that, although not promulgated as a rule, the FCC was apply-
ing the standards as a rule, disallowing anyone charged with a violation to challenge the
penalty amount assessed. Id. at 1235-36. Like the FCC guidelines, the Administrator's
penalty policies have not been made subject to rulemaking. No penalty policy of the Admin-
istrator, however, requires that any particular amount of penalty be assessed against any
particular violator for any particular violation; nor, for that matter, does any such policy
require that anyone do anything. Under these policies, each penalty determination must
incorporate an evaluation of the evidence of record in consideration of each statutory pen-
alty criteria, as interpreted by the Administrator in his policies and penalty calculation
methodologies, and each violator can challenge the appropriateness of the particular
penalty amount proposed by the Administrator's delegated complainant. See Framework
GM-22, 6-16. These policies do not share the infirmities of the FCC standards. Although
there is a basic presumption that a penalty amount calculated by applying all particular
propositions of an applicable penalty policy's methodology will result in appropriate, fair
and consistent penalty amounts being assessed, the policies themselves permit deviation
from particular propositions of their methodology, "as long as reasons for the deviations
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A careful reading of 40 C.F.R. section 22.27(b) reveals that the
Administrator allows an AJ, in making an initial decision, discretion
to determine appropriate "a penalty different in amount from the penalty
proposed by complainant," provided the ALJ "shall set forth in the initial
decision the specific reasons for the increase or decrease.""' In the very
same rule, however, the Administrator provides that an AW "shall" con-
sider the applicable penalty policy of the Administrator, and shall is a word
that generally indicates a requirement.
112
One need not go to a dictionary to comprehend the meaning of the
word "consider." In section 113(e)(1) of the CAA, for instance, Congress pro-
vides that "[i]n determining the amount of any penalty," the Administrator
"shall take into consideration" the statutory criteria that it has identified. 113
One cannot seriously argue that by "take into consideration" Congress
intended to leave the Administrator free to reject any or all of the statu-
tory penalty criteria if he thought a resulting penalty amount was too low
or excessive, and apply other criteria more to his personal liking. The
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in remanding a CWA penalty case back
to the District Court because the judge failed to consider each and every
one of the statutory criteria of section 309(d) of the CWA,"4 instructed the
judge that, in determining the amount of penalty he would assess, the
judge must "clearly indicat[e] the weight [he] gives to each of the factors
in the statute and the factual findings that support [his] conclusions."" 5
There is no discernible reason for interpreting the word "consider" as in-
corporating"reject," whether the word is used by Congress in instructing
are documented." POLICY GM-21, supra note 70, at 1. Courts have recognized that "[an
agency pronouncement is not deemed a binding regulation merely because it may have
'some substantive impact,' as long as it 'leave [s] the administrator free to exercise his
informed discretion,' and that"[piresumptions, so long as rebuttable, leave such freedom."
Panhandle Producers & Royalty Owners Ass'n v. Econ. Regulatory Admin., 822 F.2d
1105, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1987). "This court and others have consistently stated that an agency
may announce presumptions through policy statements rather than notice-and-comment
rulemaking." Id. (citing Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33,
40-41 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
"' 40 C.F.R. § 22.27(b) (2006).
112 Ass'n of Civilian Technicians, Mont. Air Chapter v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 22
F.3d 1150, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("The word 'shall' generally indicates a command that
admits of no discretion on the part of the person instructed to carry out the directive.").
113 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(1) (2000).
114 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (2000).
... Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d 1128, 1142 (11th Cir.
1990).
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the Administrator and district court judges, or by the Administrator in
instructing the subordinate ALJs on matters of law and policy.
116
Therefore, the Administrator's rule is consistent with the subordi-
nation of ALJs to the Administrator on matters of law and policy.117 It is
consistent with the intent of Congress that the Administrator be responsible
for the contents of his final decisions,"' and that his final decisions not be
arbitrary and capricious." 9 It is also consistent with the intent of Congress
in the federal environmental statutes that the Administrator determines
the amount of penalty for violations and that, in determining the amount
of penalty, the Administrator takes into account the penalty criteria iden-
tified in the statute.
120
Ultimately, whether the final penalty amount determination is
made by an ALJ in an initial decision, which becomes a final decision by
rule or by adoption by the Board, or is made by the Board itself, the Admin-
istrator is responsible for the decision. 121 Consequently, the Administrator
is obligated by law to establish effective rules and policy which will govern
decision makers who, on his behalf, will determine whether a $1 penalty or
a $25,000 penalty is appropriate for a particular violation of a federal envi-
ronmental statute. He clearly stated his intention that the Board, as his
final decision maker, "assure 0 that final decisions represent with [sic] the
position of the Agency as a whole, rather than just the position of... one
Presiding Officer. " 12 2 The position of the Agency as a whole is the position
taken in the Administrator's Rules and policy, and in the Administrator's
published decisions issued by his CJO and the Board.
The Administrator's APA responsibility for the content of his final
decisions, and for his decisions not being arbitrary and capricious, cannot
11' See Getty v. Fed. Savings & Loan Ins. Corp., 805 F.2d 1050, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
("Stating that a factor was considered, however, is not a substitute for considering it. We
must make a 'searching and careful' inquiry to determine if [the agency] actually did
consider it." (emphasis in original)).
117 See 5 U.S.C. § 556(c) (2000); 40 C.F.R. § 22.27 (2006).
118 See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2000).
1'9 See id. § 706.
120 See supra notes 12-16 (describing delegation of authority for penalties to the Admin-
istrator).
121 Skokomish Indian Tribe v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 587 F.2d 428, 431-32 (9th Cir. 1978)
(where an agency head "has broad powers to delegate his authority," the delegation of
authority "did not .. relieve him of the responsibility for action taken pursuant to the
delegation.").
122 Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing the Administrative Assessment of Civil
Penalties, 64 Fed. Reg. 40,138, 40,165 (July 23, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 22).
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be met when the Board interprets his rules to recognize each individual
AMJ as possessing broad discretion to determine penalty amounts, holding
that an AIA "has a choice of either following or deviating from" the Admin-
istrator's adopted policy, which choice "operates to preserve not restrict the
presiding officer's independence."'23 The Administrator cannot fulfill his
APA responsibility when the Board holds that it is "clear that subsumed
within the ALYs authority to assess a penalty different than one calculated
under Agency guidance is the notion that Agency guidance does not limit
the ALJ's authority to assess a penalty that is otherwise in accordance
with the statutory factors." 24
It should be noted that, on occasion, the Board has cited the APA
in an attempt to explain its recognition of discretion to be given an ALJ's
penalty assessment. The Board has stated that,
by reviewing the Region's [Administrator's delegated com-
plainant's, or enforcement staffs] analysis of the statutory
factors and independently determining that the analysis is
a reasonable one and that the recommended penalty is sup-
ported by analysis, the Presiding Officer acts to ensure that
the Agency's penalty assessment satisfies the Administrative
Procedure Act's 'abuse of discretion' standard, 5 U.S.C. §
706(2), i.e., that the assessment is neither 'unwarranted in
law' nor 'without justification in fact."2
Although ALJs do have a responsibility to assure that penalty determi-
nations in any initial decision are not without justification in fact, un-
warranted in law, or an abuse of discretion, and, consequently, that the
1231 n re DIC Americas, Inc., 6 E.A.D. 184, 191 (1995).
1 In re U.S. Army Fort Wainwright Cent. Heating & Power Plant, 11 E.A.D. 126, 172 (2003).
115 In re Employers Ins. of Wausau & Group Eight Tech., Inc., 6 E.A.D. 735, 757 (1997).
Another word on terminology: federal appellate courts have recognized that, at any hearing
to assess noncompliance penalties under a federal environmental statute, it is the Adminis-
trator who is the "proponent' of the agency compliance order." Hazardous Waste Treatment
Council v. EPA, 886 F.2d 355,367 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The Administrator has delegated that
authority to certain persons, identified in his procedural rules as complainants, 40 C.F.R.
§ 22.3 (2006), not to the various Regions, which are the ten offices he has established at
various locations across the nation for purposes of administering the agency. See 40 C.F.R.
§§ 1.1 to 1.7 (2000). Consequently, throughout this article, including passages in cited
decisions, the terms "the Administrator's delegated complainant" or "the Administrator's
enforcement staff' or "complainant" are used to designate the proponent of a proposed
penalty order rather than "the Region."
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determination is in accordance with section 706 of the APA,12 a review of
the applicable law clearly reveals that an AU does not "act to ensure that
the Agency's penalty assessment satisfies the [APA's review criteria]," as
the Board has stated. 127
ALJs also have attempted to cite the APA for the purpose of
asserting decisional independence. Without reference to any particular
statutory language, the Chief ALJ of EPA has described the ALJ role by
noting that ALJs "have decisional independence pursuant to Section 557
of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 557, which ensures the
fair and impartial resolution of adjudicatory proceedings,"128 and, without
recognizing section 556(c) of the APA,'29 or making any distinction between
factual issues and issues of law and policy, stated that ALJs "are institu-
tionally insulated from any bias in favor of EPA's positions in litigation.""'
Moreover, without any analysis of the language of section 113(d) of the
CAA, the operative statute in the case, the ChiefALJ stated that the "EPA
litigation team proposes the amount of penalty.., and [t]he ALJ, on the
other hand, independently determines the amount of a penalty."13 1
126 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
127 In re Employers Ins. of Wausau & Group Eight Tech., Inc., 6 E.A.D. at 757. See supra,
Part I(B)(1).
12 Accelerated Decision, In re U.S. Army, Fort Wainwright Cent. Heating & Power Plant,
U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency No. CAA-10-99-0121, 7 (Apr. 30, 2002).
129 5 U.S.C. § 556(c) (2000) (stating that the decisionmaking of AL.Js is "subject to the
published rules of the agency").
13 Accelerated Decision, In re U.S. Army, Fort Wainwright Cent. Heating & Power Plant,
U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency No. CAA-10-99-0121, 7 (Apr. 30, 2002).
'
311d. at 7-8 (emphasis in original). The ChiefALJ makes no mention of a number of points
of law relevant to a description of the role of an AU in the Administrator's penalty assess-
ment process: (1) that section 113(d) of the CAA, 5 U.S.C. § 7413(d), is absolutely silent as
to any role played by an ALJ in the Administrator's assessment of civil penalties; (2) that
in that same section of the CAA, Congress requires that, prior to assessing any penalty, the
Administrator provide to the alleged violator notice of his "proposal to issue such order,"
and that the complaint prepared by the EPA litigation team is the notice of the proposed
penalty order of the same Administrator who is responsible for the contents of the final
order, 5 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(2); (3) that in section 557(b) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 557(b),
Congress authorizes ALJs only to initially decide any matter, making the agency respon-
sible for the contents of any final decision and investing the agency with plenary authority
to set aside any finding or conclusion of an ALJ in his or her initial decision; and (4) that
in conformance with section 557(b) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 557(b), by rule, 40 C.F.R. § 22.27,
the Administrator authorizes an ALJ only to issue initial decisions, and invests the Board
with authority to make his final decisions, which includes plenary authority to set aside
any finding or conclusion made by an ALJ in his or her initial decision, and an obligation
to assure that his final decisions are consistent.
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Again, all federal environmental statutes invest exclusive authority
to assess penalties in the Administrator, not ALJs, and under section 557(b)
of the APA,l a2 an ALJ has authority only to issue initial decisions on be-
half of an agency. This same section authorizes only an agency-again, for
our purposes, that being the Administratorl13 -to issue final decisions,
thereby making the Administrator, not an ALJ, responsible for the con-
tent of all final decisions. Consequently, section 706 of the APA makes the
agency, i.e., the Administrator, not various individual ALJs, responsible
for assuring that final decisions are not arbitrary or capricious or an abuse
of discretion, or not in accordance with law. Having delegated his final
decision-making authority to the Board, and having specifically declared
that the Board "is responsible for assuring consistency in Agency adjudi-
cations" and "assur[ing] that final decisions represent with [sic] the position
of the Agency as a whole, rather than just the position of... one Presiding
Officer," 35 the Administrator has made the Board itself responsible for
assuring that all final decisions of the Administrator meet judicial review
criteria identified in section 706 of the APA, not each of the several ALJs
assigned to the Administrator.
136
The Board also has attempted to support its "deference" to ALJ
"discretion" in the determination of an appropriate penalty amount by ex-
plaining its position in consideration of the subject federal environmental
statute. It did this in its decision in In Re Johnson Pacific, Inc. 13 The record
reviewed in the matter revealed that the Administrator's enforcement staff
filed an administrative complaint proposing a $9,600 penalty-an amount
determined by an application of the Administrator's penalty policy-for
Respondent's violations of FIFRA. The AW found all violations proven, but
determined a penalty of $4,080 was appropriate. 31 The Administrator's
enforcement staff appealed to the Board. In the Administrator's final
decision, the Board stated that,
[a]lthough the Board has discretion to increase or decrease
the amount of a civil penalty assessed by a presiding officer,
132 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2000).
133 See supra note 20.
134 See supra note 28.
131 Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing the Administrative Assessment of Civil
Penalties, 64 Fed. Reg. 40,138, 40,165 (July 23, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 22).
136 Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing the Administrative Assessment of Civil
Penalties, 64 Fed. Reg. 40,138, 40,165 (July 23, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 22).
"' In re Johnson Pacific, Inc., 5 E.A.D. 696 (1995).
138 Id.
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we customarily defer to the Presiding Officer if the Presiding
Officer has provided a reasonable explanation for the assess-
ment and if the penalty amount is within the range pre-
scribed by any applicable guidelines.139
The Board went on to state that "no increase in the Presiding Officer's
penalty assessment is warranted," and, with regard to certain objections
raised by enforcement staff to the AJ's selected penalty amount, "we are
not persuaded that they are sufficiently well founded for us to exercise our
discretion to interfere with the latitude which FIFRA affords a Presiding
Officer when deliberating over the 'appropriateness' of the penalty. See
FIFRA § 12(a)(4)." 140
A review, however, of section 14(a)(4) of FIFRA,-there is no section
12(a)(4) of FIFRA, cited by the Board-reveals that Congress does not
mention Presiding Officers or ALJs at all, much less grant ALJs latitude
when deliberating over the appropriateness of any penalty amount or the
authority to assess civil penalties.14 1 To the contrary, the language of
Congress is clear: any violator of FIFRA "may be assessed a civil penalty
by the Administrator of not more than $5,000 for each offense," and "[in
determining the amount of the penalty the Administrator shall consider
the appropriateness of such penalty to the size of the business of the person
charged, the effect on the person's ability to continue in business, and the
gravity of the violation." 42
b. Arbitrary and Capricious Penalty Determinations of the Board
The fact that reasonable men and women may be of a different mind
regarding appropriate sanctions for violations of the law is well recognized.
Indeed, the Board itself has observed that "reasonable people may disagree
over the amount of penalty in a particular case." Given that observation
of human nature, it should not be surprising that various Board members,
ALJs, and delegated complainants of the Administrator, as individuals,
may have differing ideas as to whether a $5,000 or $20,000 penalty is
warranted for a particular violation of a federal environmental statute.
It is entirely possible that a reasonably plausible explanation could be
139 Id. at 702.
140 id.
141 See 7 U.S.C. § 1361(a)(4) (2000).
142 Id. (emphasis added).
" In re Johnson Pacific, Inc., 5 E.A.D. at 703.
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given to support either penalty amount, depending upon the weight and
interpretation given to the various narrative statutory penalty criteria,
and the policy adopted by the decision maker.
Regardless of the personal views of any Board member, ALJ, or
delegated complainant of the Administrator regarding an appropriate pen-
alty amount for a violation of a federal environmental statute, Congress
makes clear in those statutes that it is the Administrator who is respon-
sible for assessing and determining the amount of civil penalties for their
violation.'" Moreover, Congress makes the agency, i.e., the Administrator,
responsible for the content of his final decisions. 4 '
Unfortunately, a review of the Board's decisions reveals that, not-
withstanding the statutory requirement that the Administrator not be
arbitrary and capricious in his final decisionmaking, 46 and the Board's
obligation to the Administrator to "assur[e] consistency in Agency adjudi-
cations" and "assure El that final decisions represent with [sic] the position
of the Agency as a whole, rather than just the position of... one Presiding
Officer,"'47 the Board has been unable to consistently interpret and apply
the rules and policies of the Administrator relating to the determination
of penalty amounts in final decisions of the Administrator.
With regard to some violators, the Board has adopted ALJ penalty
determinations as final decisions of the Administrator, holding that the
ALJs were acting within their discretion in finding the full amount of
penalty proposed by enforcement staff appropriate, as calculated by an
application of the relevant penalty policy of the Administrator. 148 More-
over, "the Board has emphasized that the Agency's penalty policies should
be applied whenever possible because such policies 'assure that statutory
factors are taken into account and are designed to assure that penalties are
assessed in a fair and consistent manner,"' 49 which is what the Adminis-
trator's final penalty orders must manifest to satisfy criteria of the federal
144 See supra, Part I(B)(1).
145 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2000).
146 Id. § 706 (2000).
147 Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing the Administrative Assessment of Civil
Penalties, 64 Fed. Reg. 40,138, 40,165 (July 23, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 22).
,
48 See, e.g., In re Newell Recycling Co., Inc., 8 E.A.D. 598,643 (1999) ("Presiding Officer did
not err in determining that the proposed $1.345 million civil penalty was an appropriate
one."); In re Spitzer Great Lakes, Ltd., 9 E.A.D. 302,321-22 (2000) (stating that "we find no
error in the Initial Decision issued by the Presiding Officer," and "[a] ccordingly, Spitzer is
assessed a civil penalty of $165,000").
"' In re Carroll Oil Co., 10 E.A.D. 635, 656 (2002).
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environmental statutes and section 706 of the APA. 15' As to other violators
for whom the Administrator's delegated complainants have proposed a
penalty amount for violations determined by an application of the Admin-
istrator's penalty policy to the evidence, and ALJs in their initial decisions
have found a different amount of penalty appropriate for the same vio-
lations without reference to the policy, the Board also has found no error
on the part of the ALJs, adopting the ALJs' penalty determinations as
final decisions of the Administrator.
On the record under review in In Re V-1 Oil Co., the Administrator's
delegated complainant proposed a penalty of $36,674 for violations alleged
in a complaint, applying the Administrator's penalty policy to the evidence;
the AJ found a penalty amount of $25,000 to be appropriate for the same
violations.' In the Board's own words, the AU "based his penalty assess-
ment solely on the statutory criteria of RCRA section 9006(c), rather
than on the EPA penalty policy implementing the statute on which the
[Administrator's enforcement staff] relied in proposing the penalty."'52
Without comment, the Board quoted the ALJ's analysis supporting his
penalty determination as follows:
[wihile the use of this ... [p]enalty [p]olicy may provide for
a more consistent national approach by EPA, and in some
cases may even be helpful to the judge in determining the
appropriate penalty to be assessed (see 40 C.F.R. § 22.27(b)),
the Environmental Appeals Board is correct in stating [in
In Re Employers Insurance of Wausau and Group Eight
Technology, Incorporated, 6 E.A.D. 735, 759 (1997)] that
ultimately it is the statutory penalty criteria against which
the judge is to measure the facts adduced at hearing and
assess a civil penalty.153
Consequently, in contrast to Newel Recycling Company and Spitzer Great
Lakes, Ltd., V-1 Oil Company's penalty amount was determined in com-
plete disregard of the Administrator's penalty policy, as if the policy were
simply a nullity.
In adopting the ALJ's penalty determination in the final decision
of the Administrator, however, the Board did not comment on the relevance
150 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
151 In re V-1 Oil Co., 8 E.A.D. 729, 753-57 (2000).
'
52 Id. at 753 (emphasis added).
153 Id. at 755 n.41.
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of the governing statutes to its action. These statutes require a consistent
national approach in the Administrator's final decisionmaking5 4 and
invest the Administrator, not the ALJ, with the authority to determine
the penalty amount in consideration of the statutory penalty criteria.'55
In In re John A Capozzi, the Board noted that it "reserves the right
to closely scrutinize substantial deviations from the relevant penalty policy"
and that it "may set aside the AI's penalty assessment" where "the AJ's
reasons for deviating from the penalty policy are not persuasive or convin-
cing."156 This standard was not applied. In Capozzi, the Administrator's en-
forcement staff proposed a penalty of $156,064 for the violations alleged, 15 7
the amount determined by an application of the Administrator's RCRA pen-
alty policy. 5 ' In his initial decision, the AU found the respondent liable
for the same violations as alleged, but determined that a $37,600 penalty
amount was appropriate.5 9 Although a review of the initial decision re-
veals that the AU completely ignored the Administrator's adopted penalty
policy, not even acknowledging its existence," ° the Board found and held
that "while the AJ's rationale for reducing the penalty is admittedly brief,
it is sufficiently reasoned and supported by the record to constitute an
adequate justification for departing from the [p]enalty [p]olicy." 1 1
15 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (stating that agency decisionmaking shall be held unlawful if
arbitrary or capricious).
'
55 See SWDA § 9006(c), 42 U.S.C. § 699le(c) (2000) (stating that an order "shall... assess
a penalty, if any, which the Administrator determines is reasonable taking into account"
the statutory penalty criteria). Nor did the Board explain its adoption of the AL's penalty
determination in light of: (1) the governing rule of the Administrator requiring the AW to
consider the penalty policy, 40 C.F.R. § 22.27(b) (the AU "shall consider any civil penalty
guidelines issued under the Act" violated)), and the statutory provision making an AU's
authority subject to the rules of the agency, see 5 U.S.C. § 556(c); (2) the Administrator's
recognition in his general penalty policy that "It]reating similar situations in a similar fash-
ion is central to the credibility of EPA's enforcement effort and to the success of achieving
the goal of equitable treatment," POLICY GM-22, supra note 70, at 27, and; (3) the Admin-
istrator's instruction that the Board is "responsible for assuring consistency in Agency
adjudications by all of the AIJs" and it "assures that final decisions represent with [sic]
the position of the Agency as a whole, rather than just the position of ... one [ALJ]."
Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing the Administrative Assessment of Civil
Penalties, 64 Fed. Reg. 40,138, 40,165 (July 23, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 22).
156 In re John A. Capozzi, 11 E.A.D. 10, 32 (2003).
157 Id. at 19.158 Id. at 38-39.
159 Id. at 20.
6
°In Re Capozzi Custom Cabinets, U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency No. RCRA-5-2000-005, 13-21
(Feb. 11, 2002) (initial decision).
16' In re John A. Capozzi, 11 E.A.D. at 38.
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In the final decision of the Administrator, the Board identifies no
reasons articulated by the AW in his initial decision for deviating from
the penalty policy, nor does it offer any explanation as to how an AU can
identify persuasive or convincing reasons for departing from the Admin-
istrator's adopted penalty policy, when the AJ does not even acknowledge
the existence of the policy.162 As in V-1 Oil Co., the Board does not address
governing law.
163
Persistent in its desire to defer to an AU's discretion in his or her
assessment of a penalty, the Board has manifested inconsistency with re-
gard to the very same penalty policy of the Administrator. In In re Pacific
Refining Company, the Board determined appropriate and assessed a pen-
alty amount for violations of the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-To-Know Act ("EPCRA"), applying the 1992 penalty policy adopted
by the Administrator for the purpose of determining appropriate penalty
amounts for violations of that statute."M The Board found that, "on the
record before us, we discern no sound reason why the 1992 [policy's] penalty
formula for untimely reporting should not be applied to derive a gravity-
based penalty in this case." 65 Three years later, however, an ALA in a pen-
alty determination in an initial decision found the very same policy to be
162 One cannot assume that an ALJ, or any other decision maker, considers something when
there is nothing in the decision maker's written decision to support such a conclusion.
Sound decisionmaking requires that there be findings and an articulated rational basis
appearing in any written decision to support conclusions and determinations that are
made. Final decisions of an administrative agency, such as the one the Board made on
behalf of the Administrator in Capozzi, must be judged "solely by the grounds invoked
by the agency." Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 169 (1962).
See also Harborlite Corp. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 613 F.2d 1088, 1092 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) ("[A]n agency's order must be upheld, if at all, 'on the same basis articulated
in the order by the agency itself.'"); Citizens Ass'n of Georgetown, Inc. v. Zoning Comm'n
of the Dist. of Columbia, 477 F.2d 402,409 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("[The articulation of reasons
by an agency-for itself and for the public-does afford a safeguard against arbitrary and
careless action and is apt to result in greater consistency in an agency's decisionmaking.");
Saginaw Broad. Co. v. FCC, 96 F.2d 554,559 (D.C. Cir. 1938) ("The requirement of findings
is thus far from a technicality. On the contrary, it is to insure against Star Chamber
methods, to make certain that justice shall be administered according to facts and law.").
If an ALJ's initial decision does not manifest an articulation of reasons to support the
penalty determination being made, and the Board adopts that initial decision as the final
decision of the Administrator, the Administrator's final decision is likewise legally deficient
in this regard.
I63 1n re John A. Capozzi, 11 E.A.D. at 38.
In re Pac. Refining Co., 5 E.A.D. 607 (1994).
165 Id. at 614.
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"arbitrary and unauthorized by... statute," and the Board adopted the
AJ's penalty determination as the final decision of the Administrator. 166
In his initial decision in In Re Hall Signs, Inc., the AJ rejected the
penalty formula of the policy itself, noting that, in contrast to the policy's
gravity-based penalty formula, "[i]t would be a simple matter to construct
a matrix or sliding scale with greater flexibility, based primarily on the
amount of chemical involved in the violation, and perhaps secondarily, on
the size of the violator's business."167 He noted that "[i]n its determination
of 'extent level,' the [Administrator's penalty policy] in effect considers
the size of the violator's business as at least as significant a factor as the
amount of chemical involved in the violation," and that in his opinion,
"[t]here is nothing in EPCRA that indicates that the size of the business
of the violator should be a significant penalty factor."' The ALJ found
that "the [policy's] figure of $5,000 [w] as an appropriate minimum gravity-
based penalty for the 'circumstance level 1' violation of failure to timely
report toxic chemical usage.., for relatively minor violations by businesses
of any size," and that, in contrast to the Administrator's policy, "[t]his type
of scheme would more fairly assess penalties commensurate with the degree
to which the violation actually impaired EPCRA's mission to inform the
community of [the] facilities' release or use of toxic chemicals."'69
The Board, noting that an ALJ "has discretion to assess a penalty
different in amount from the penalty requested in the complaint" and
"may depart from the penalty policy so long as the reasons for departure
are adequately explained," 7 ° adopted the initial decision of the ALJ as the
Administrator's final decision, stating that
[a] lthough the methodology used by the Presiding Officer in
calculating the penalty in this case represents a substantial
departure from the [Administrator's penalty policy], his
... In re Hall Signs, Inc., U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency No. 5-EPCRA-96-026, 8 (Oct. 30, 1997)
(initial decision).
167 Id. at 6.
168 Id. at 7.
169 Id. at 9. Note that the language used by the ALJ--"to construct a matrix;" "there is
nothing in EPCRA that indicates;" "this type of scheme would more fairly assess pen-
alties commensurate with the degree to which the violation actually impaired EPCRA's
mission'-is language of statutory interpretation and policymaking, not fact finding on
the evidence of record in the particular case before the AL.
170 In Re Hall Signs, Inc., U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency EPCRA Appeal No. 97-6, 5-6 (Dec. 16,
1998) (final order).
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analysis establishes that he considered the [Administrator's
penalty policy] as required by the regulations, but did not
find it appropriate as applied in this case.17'
Although the Board noted that the ALA limited his finding "to the facts of
this case" and "on this record" and "as applied in this case,"'72 the alleged
defects identified by the AIA were defects inherent in the policy itself. The
AM found that the policy matrix was not sufficiently flexible;'73 EPCRA
did not support the policy's adoption of a "size of violator's business"'74 as
a significant factor in determining a penalty amount; and a type of scheme
other than that stated in the policy "would more fairly assess penalties
commensurate with the degree to which the violation actually impaired
EPCRA."'75 Neither the Board nor the AM acknowledged that, in decision-
making, an ALJ is not authorized by law to exercise judicial review of the
Administrator's policies, but rather is subordinate to the law and policy of
the Administrator.'76 Moreover, the Board did not explain how, in adopt-
ing the ALJ's finding that the Administrator's penalty policy in these re-
gards was "arbitrary and unauthorized by statute,"'77 such a finding could
somehow be restricted to the Hall Signs case. If the policy is arbitrary,
unauthorized by the statute, and defective, how, by merely applying it to
a different set of facts, can the same policy be cloaked with authorization
under the statute?
Three months later, in In re Catalina Yachts, the Board found that
the very same EPCRA penalty policy "'reasonably implements the statutory
criteria, with a range of penalties to reflect differing circumstances."17 The
Board made no mention of its earlier adopted findings that the policy
matrix was not sufficiently flexible, or that EPCRA did not support the
policy's adoption of a "size of the business of the violator"'7 9 as a significant
171 Id. at 9.
172 Id.
"' In re Hall Signs, Inc., U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency No. 5-EPCRA-96-026, 6 (Oct. 30, 1997)
(initial decision).
174Id.
175 Id. at 9.
1 7
1 See supra note 24 (discussing the distribution of authority between the Administrator
and the ALJs). -
1771 n re Hall Signs, Inc., U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency No. 5-EPCRA-96-026, 8 (Oct. 30, 1997)
(initial decision).
178 In re Catalina Yachts, Inc., 8 E.A.D. 199, 209 (1999) (citing In re Genicom Corp., 4
E.A.D. 426, 431 (1992)).
171 In re Hall Signs, Inc., U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency No. 5-EPCRA-96-026, 6 (Oct. 30, 1997)
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factor in determining a penalty amount, or that another "type of scheme"
other than that stated in the policy would "more fairly assess penalties
commensurate with the degree to which the violation actually impaired
EPCRA."'80 The final decision of the Administrator in Catalina Yachts, Inc.
was upheld on judicial review, with the Court finding that the Administra-
tor's EPCRA policy was "reasonable and consistent with the [statute]."'
The Board also has allowed initial decisions of ALJs to become final
decisions of the Administrator, notwithstanding the fact that the Board
directly acknowledged that the penalty determinations in the decisions were
not in compliance with the Administrator's regulations and policies, and
that an adequate explanation for the penalty amount determined appro-
priate had not been articulated.
In In re Lu Vern G. Kienast, an AU issued an initial decision in a
civil penalty enforcement action for CAA asbestos violations."8 2 Violations
were alleged in an eleven count complaint, and the ALJ found the re-
spondent liable for violations in nine of those counts. 183 In explaining his
penalty determination, the ALJ acknowledged his obligations under the
Administrator's Rule, 40 C.F.R. § 22.27(b), and the Administrator's adopted
penalty policy."S The AJ, however, simply listed the penalty amounts he
was selecting for each of the nine counts of different violation he had found
proven, with no explanation provided for his selection of those penalty
amounts other than "[tihese penalties are appropriate under the partic-
ular facts and circumstances of this case," and this general conclusion:
[p]ursuant to 'other factors as justice may require' under
Section 113(e) of the [CAA], the EPA's suggested civil admin-
istrative penalty of $113,600 has been reduced to $35,000
to account for the size of Respondents' business, the per-
ceived economic impact of the penalty on the business and
Respondents' good faith efforts to comply with the require-
ments of the asbestos NESHAP.8 5
(initial decision) (adopted by the Board in In Re Hall Signs, Inc., U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency
EPCRA Appeal No. 97-6 (Dec. 16, 1998) (final order).
,s0 Id. at 9.
181 Catalina Yachts, Inc. v. EPA, 112 F. Supp. 2d 965, 969 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
182In re Lu Vern G. Kienast, No. CAA-5-2001-007 (2003) (initial decision).
'83Id. at 28.
18 Id. at 23.
115 Id. at 24-25.
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The ALJ conducted no evidentiary analysis in his initial decision to
provide support for any of his findings and conclusions regarding his
penalty amount determination on any of the nine counts of violation. Nor
was any reason provided by the ALJ for not applying the Administrator's
penalty policy, or for his selection of the particular amounts of penalty. 186
On September 23, 2003, the Board, on behalf of the Administrator,
issued an "Order Electing to Review Sua Sponte" in the matter. 187 The
Board had not received an appeal from either party, but "determined that
the AU's penalty assessment warranted further review" as "the Board had
concerns regarding the sufficiency of the ALJ's rationale for reducing
[the Complainant's] proposed penalty from $113,600 to $35,000."188
A year later, on September 16, 2004, the Board revoked its earlier
order, stating "[n] otwithstanding our reservations about the sufficiency
of the ALJ's explanation for reducing the proposed penalty, the Board is
disinclined to disturb the AI's $35,000 penalty assessment in view of the
totality of the circumstances, including the fact that neither of the parties
has filed a timely appeal." 8 ' No further reason is given by the Board for
adopting the AIJ's penalty determination and allowing his initial decision
to become the Administrator's final decision. Although the Board continues
to question "the sufficiency of the AUJ's explanation for reducing the pro-
posed penalty" by 70%, the Board quite simply "is disinclined to disturb"
the discretion it believes that the AI's "penalty assessment" must have. 90
The Board does not acknowledge that, in an earlier final decision it issued
on behalf of the Administrator, it found that the very same penalty policy
ignored by the ALJ in In re Lu Vern G. Kienast "reasonably implements
the statutory criteria for assessment of a penalty under the Clean Air
Act,"191 and that the Board itself applied the policy in determining an
appropriate penalty amount for CAA asbestos NESHAP violations.'92
In F.R. & S, Inc., the Board, "on its own initiative," issued an "Order
Under 40 C.F.R. § 22.30(b)."' 93 Neither Respondent nor the Administrator's
186 See id.
117 In re Lu Vern G. Kienast, U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency Appeal No. CAA 5-2001-007, 2
(Sept. 16, 2004) (Order Revoking Election of Sua Sponte Review).
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 In re House Analysis & Assocs. & Fred Powell, 4 E.A.D. 501, 508-09 (1993).
192 In re Ocean State Asbestos Removal, Inc., 7 E.A.D. 522, 534-60 (1998).
193 In re F.R. & S, Inc., U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency Appeal No. CAA 03-2002-0215, 1 (March 17,
2005) (admin. review).
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enforcement staff had appealed the ALJ's initial decision in the matter
to the Board.'94 The Board acknowledged that it "considered" the initial
decision, expressed "concern that the ALJ's penalty analysis does not
appear to conform fully to the requirements set forth in the applicable
regulations" of the Administrator, but announced that it "decided not to
undertake appellate review of the decision."'95
The Board noted that, by 40 C.F.R. § 22.27(b), the Administrator
requires that an AUJ, in determining appropriate penalty amounts, "shall
consider any civil penalty guidelines issued under the Act," and that "the
ALJ failed to discuss, or even mention, the Agency penalty policy appli-
cable to the four violations."'96 The Board concluded that "it is not clear
if the ALJ considered the policy as required." 9 7 The Board went on to
state the following:
In addition, the A_ significantly reduced the penalty pro-
posed by the complainant for all four of the violations [from
$71,500 to $42,000], but the ALJ set forth in the Initial
Decision specific reasons explaining the reduction for only
one of the violations. 198
Nonetheless, the Board insists on deferring to the AI, stating that
the Board has decided not to disturb the ALJ's penalty
assessment even though the ALU's analysis does not fully
conform to the regulatory requirements. The Board's decision
not to take review on its own initiative in this matter should
not be viewed as an endorsement of the ALJ's departure
from the regulatory requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 22.27(b).' 99
The Board, in its orders in In re Lu Vern G. Keinast and in F.R. &
S., does not acknowledge that Congress, in section 113(d) of the CAA,
invests authority to assess civil penalties for violations of the CAA exclu-
sively in the Administrator, with no authority invested in ALJs; 20 0 that
1
94 Id.
195Id,
196 Id. at 2.
197 Id.
198Id.
'
99 Id. at 3.
200 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d) (2000).
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Congress, in section 556(c) of the APA, provides that an ALJ's decision-
making is subordinate to the rules and policy of the Administrator; 21 that
Congress, in section 557(b) of the APA, provides that the Administrator
is responsible for the contents of all final decisions; 20 2 that Congress, in
section 706 of the APA, provides that final decisions of the Administrator
must be consistent, not arbitrary and capricious;2 3 and that federal courts
reviewing final agency action have maintained a "rigorous insistence on
the need for the conjunction of articulated standards and reflective findings,
in furtherance of even-handed application of law."20 4
Moreover, the Board said nothing in either of these orders regarding
the Administrator having invested in the Board plenary authority to "set
aside the findings of fact and conclusions of law or discretion contained" in
any initial decision of an AIU,205 with specific instructions that the Board
"is responsible for assuring consistency in Agency adjudications by all of
the ALJs," and that the Board is to "assure U that final decisions repre-
sent with [sic] the position of the Agency as a whole, rather than just the
position of... one Presiding Officer [A 2].°6
Given the Board's willingness to allow initial decisions of ALJs
to become final decisions of the Administrator, notwithstanding the Board's
open recognition that the ALJ has not conformed with the Administra-
tor's Rules in making the decision, and that it does not endorse the ALJ's
position, it is difficult to see how the Board can assure consistency in the
Administrator's final decisions. It is also difficult to see how the Board can
assure that those decisions represent the position of the agency as a whole
rather that the position of an individual AIJ.
Initial decisions of AIJs which have become final decisions of the
Administrator by rule,2°7 as they were not appealed by the Administrator's
enforcement staff or otherwise reviewed by the Board, also have been
capricious as a consequence of ALJs rejecting the Administrator's penalty
policies on an ad hoc basis. In In Re Gypsum North Corp., the Adminis-
trator's final decision rejects a penalty amount of $17,600 proposed for a
CAA asbestos rule violation, calculated by applying the Administrator's
201 5 U.S.C. § 556(c) (2000); see also supra note 24.
202 See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2000); see also supra note 28.
203 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
204 Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d. 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
205 40 C.F.R. § 22.30(f) (2006).
20 Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing the Administrative Assessment of Civil
Penalties, 64 Fed. Reg. 40,138, 40,165 (July 23, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 22).
207 40 C.F.R. § 22.27(c) (2007).
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adopted CAA penalty policy for asbestos rule violations. °8 The ALJ said
this about the Administrator's policy:
Because the [p]olicy operated as an edict, affording no indi-
vidualized assessment of the particular facts surrounding
the violation, it failed to comport with the statutory com-
mand that the penalty criteria be considered. Accordingly,
the [A_] departs from the [p] olicy and looks to the statutory
criteria to determine an appropriate penalty.0 9
The ALJ assessed a penalty amount of $1,000.210 This decision does not
recognize, as we have seen, that the Administrator, in an earlier final
decision issued by the Board, found that the very same penalty policy
"reasonably implements the statutory criteria for assessment of a penalty
under the Clean Air Act."211 Nor does it recognize that the Board had
utilized the policy in determining penalty amounts for CAA asbestos rule
violations. 2
Similarly, in the initial decision in In re GCA Chemical Corp., the
ALJ rejected the Administrator's adopted penalty policy, and the penalty
amount of $37,400 for a party's failure to file two reports required by TSCA
inventory update regulations, because the AJ disagreed with certain pro-
visions of the policy and found that the policy "operates as an edict."21' The
AUJ announced his personal position that a $6,600 penalty was appropriate
for the party's failing to file the two reports. 214 This initial decision, now
a final decision of the Administrator, does not recognize that, in an earlier
final decision, the Administrator, by the Board, approved the use of the very
same penalty policy in determining an $85,000 penalty amount appro-
priate for a party's failure to file five of the very same reports.215 In the
final decision in In re GCA Chemical Corp., there is no attempt to explain
how it was that GCA Chemical Company's failure to file a TSCA inventory
208 In Re Gypsum North Corp., U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency No. CAA 02-2001-1253, 7, 16
(Nov. 1, 2002) (initial decision).
209 Id. at 11.
210 Id. at 16.
211 In re House Analysis & Assocs. & Fred Powell, 4 E.A.D. 501, 508-09 (1993).
212 In re Ocean State Asbestos Removal, Inc., 7 E.A.D. 522, 534-60 (1998).
213 In re GCA Chemical Corp., U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency No. TSCA-4-2000-0130, 1, 11-12
(June 18, 2002) (initial decision).214 Id. at 20.
211 In re DIC Americas, Inc., 6 E.A.D. 184, 188-93 (1995).
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update report warranted a penalty amount 82% below that found appro-
priate for DIC Americas, Inc., which had failed to file the very same report.
Such penalty determinations are driven by the discretion of the
individual ALJs, not the rules and policies of the Administrator. As a con-
sequence, these final decisions of the Administrator are not consistent,
but, contrary to the standards of section 706 of the APA, are arbitrary
and capricious.21 s
Although the final decisions here reviewed were written by others,
we have seen that the Administrator is responsible for them all.2 17 In some
final decisions, the Administrator emphasizes that it is necessary for his
penalty policies to be used so as to "assure that statutory factors are taken
into account" and that "penalties are assessed in a fair and consistent
manner."21 As to some violators, such as Newell Recycling Company,
Spitzer Great Lakes, Ltd. and Catalina Yachts, Inc., the Administrator
issues final decisions finding his penalty policies appropriate vehicles to be
used in determining that a substantial penalty is warranted for violations,
as proposed by his delegated complainant. Yet, as to other violators, such
as Hall Signs, Gypsum North Corporation, GCA Chemical Corporation, Lu
Vern G. Kienast, and F.R. & S., Inc., the Administrator issues final deci-
sions in which he rejects or ignores his own penalty policy, or finds his
penalty policy defective. Having abandoned his policy in the second group
of cases, the Administrator provides little or no articulation of how he
arrived at the penalty amount determined appropriate, or how the amount
manifests a "conjunction of articulated standards and reflective findings,
in furtherance of even-handed application of law. ,219 Nor does the Admin-
istrator demonstrate how he determined a penalty amount appropriate
that is significantly less than that yielded by his policy.
The Administrator leaves unexplained in his decisions how he can
find that his EPCRA penalty policy, as to one violator, is "arbitrary and un-
authorized by statute" because the policy's penalty matrix is not appropriate
216 It must be added that there is no explanation in the Administrator's final decisions
in either In re Gypsum North or In re GCA Chemical Corp. that: (1) describes how the
particular amount of penalty chosen was selected, (2) distinguishes the earlier decision
approving of, and applying, the same policy, or, (3) describes how the selection of the
penalty amount chosen manifested "the agency's policies effectuat[ing] general standards,
applied without unreasonable discrimination." Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC,
444 F.2d. 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
211 See Skokomish Indian Tribe v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 587 F.2d 428,431-32 (9th Cir. 1978).
... In re Carroll Oil Co., 10 E.A.D. 635, 656 (2002).
219 Greater Boston Television Corp., 444 F.2d at 852.
[Vol. 32:57
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONMAKING BY JUDGES
under EPCRA,2 2 ° yet as to another violator find that the very same policy,
including its penalty matrix, "'reasonably implements the statutory cri-
teria, with a range of penalties to reflect differing circumstances.'"22' Nor
does he explain how his CAA penalty policy, as to one violator, can be
found to "reasonably implement[] the statutory criteria for assessment
of a penalty under the [CAA] ,22 yet turn around and, as to another vio-
lator, reject the policy, finding that the very same policy is "an edict" and
"fail [s] to comport with the statutory command that the penalty criteria
be considered." 223 He does not explain how he can find his TSCA penalty
policy to be appropriate for determining one person's TSCA reporting vio-
lations,224 yet when confronted with another person committing the same
violations, find the same policy to "operatea as an edict," rejecting the
policy as a legitimate tool for use in determining a penalty amount.225 This
is arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking, contrary to section 706 of the
APA.2 26 Penalty determinations in the Administrator's final decisions turn
on the personal notions and beliefs of whichever one of several ALJs pre-
sided over the matter, rather than on the promulgated rules and articu-
lated policies of the Administrator. Again, "[w] hen disposition depends
more on which judge is assigned to the case than on the facts or the legal
rules," it has been recognized that "the tendency is to describe the system
as lawless, arbitrary, or the like."227
220In re Hall Signs, Inc., U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency No. 5-EPCRA-96-026, 8 (Oct. 30, 1997)
(initial decision).
221 In re Catalina Yachts, Inc., 8 E.A.D. 199, 209 (1999) (citing In re Genicom Corp., 4
E.A.D. 426, 431 (1992)).
21 In re House Analysis & Assocs. & Fred Powell, 4 E.A.D. 501, 508-09 (1993).
22 In Re Gypsum North Corp., U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency No. CAA 02-2001-1253, 11 (Nov.
1, 2002) (initial decision).
224 In re DIC Americas, Inc., 6 E.A.D. 184, 188-92 (1995).
... In re GCA Chemical Corp., U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency No. TSCA-4-2000-0130, 1, 11-12
(June 18, 2002) (initial decision).
226 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000). "It is axiomatic that an administrative agency either must
conform with its own precedents or explain its departure from them." Ohio Fast Freight,
Inc. v. United States, 574 F.2d 316, 319 (6th Cir. 1978). "[Algencies are subject to the
requirement that they not act arbitrarily or capriciously and have an obligation to render
consistent opinions and to either follow, distinguish or overrule their own precedent."
Chisholm v. Def. Logistics Agency, 656 F.2d 42, 47 (3d Cir. 1981) (citation omitted). An
agency "'cannot act arbitrarily nor can it treat similar situations in dissimilar ways,' and
we remand litigation to the agency when it did not take pains to reconcile an apparent
difference in the treatment accorded litigants circumstanced alike." Garrett v. Fed.
Commc'ns Comm., 513 F.2d 1056, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (citations omitted).
227 Santise v. Schweiker, 676 F.2d. 925, 930 (3d Cir. 1982).
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The point must be emphasized that at issue here is not any specific
amount ofpenalty for the particular violations committed by any particular
violator. Specific penalty amounts determined appropriate for violations
in specific cases will be fact driven. Although similar violations may war-
rant different penalty amounts being assessed against different violators,
the differences will be predicated on the specific evidence in the case, ana-
lyzed in consideration of a consistent interpretation of statutory penalty
criteria which the Administrator is required, by law, to take into account
in determining the penalty amount he will assess. The amount of pollutant
may vary, or the level of culpability of violators may differ, and each vio-
lator's ability to pay a particular amount of penalty may differ. As earlier
observed, however, Congress permits penalty amounts from $1 or less, up
to $25,000, to be assessed by the Administrator for each violation or day
of violation of the CAA, RCRA, EPCRA, and others.22 The interpretation
and relative weight to be given to each of the statutory penalty criteria,
and the method used to apply those criteria to the evidence in the record
of a case, will have a significant impact on whether the penalty amount will
be closer to $1 or closer to $25,000. As Congress makes the Administrator,
not individual ALJs, responsible for the content of his final decisions assess-
ing penalty amounts,229 the Administrator, by the Board, must exercise con-
trol over law and policy to be applied in his penalty assessment process to
assure that arbitrary and capricious decisions will not issue on his behalf.
Finally, if, as the Board has acknowledged, "penalty policies should
be applied whenever possible because such policies assure that statutory
factors are taken into account and are designed to 'assure that penalties
are assessed in a fair and consistent manner'"23 does it not follow that a
failure to apply such policies will increase the likelihood that statutory fac-
tors are not taken into account, and that penalty amounts are not assessed
in a fair and consistent manner? As demonstrated by the numerous deci-
sions of the Administrator here reviewed-with the Board's explicitly stat-
ing its belief that ALJs "assess" penalties; that in determining the amount
of any penalty, ALJs have independence; and that it will give deference to
penalty determinations of ALJs-the Board's failure to consistently apply
the Administrator's penalty policies has resulted in the Administrator
228 See supra note 59.
229 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2000).
'0 In re Carroll Oil Co., 10 E.A.D. 635, 656 (2002) (emphasis added).
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issuing final orders which do not articulate a consideration of all statutory
penalty criteria, and which assess penalties which have not been deter-
mined appropriate in a fair and consistent manner.
B. The Application of Law Governing Litigation in the
Administrator's Civil Penalty Process
As earlier observed, in accordance with section 554 of the APA,231
the Administrator promulgated rules to "govern all administrative adjudi-
catory proceedings" for the assessment of civil penalties under the various
federal environmental statutes.232 Furthermore, Congress invested AIJs
with authority "[slubject to published rules of the agency, ", 233 and the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has held that,
although an ALJ must "conduct the cases over which he presides with
complete objectivity and independence," the AIU is "governed . .. by
applicable and controlling precedents," and that these precedents in-
clude "agency regulations" and the "agency's policies as laid down in its
published decisions."234 And, consistent with his statutory duty to issue
decisions that are not arbitrary and capricious,235 the Administrator has
made the Board "responsible for assuring consistency in Agency adjudi-
cations" and for assuring that his "final decisions represent with [sic] the
position of the Agency as a whole, rather than just the position of... one
Presiding Officer." 236 Consequently, it is the responsibility of the Board
to see that the record of the Administrator's many final decisions manifests
a consistent interpretation and application of the Administrator's Rules.
Notwithstanding its obligations under the law, the Board has
chosen to defer to various AIU rulings on issues of law, even though the
ALJs have ignored or rejected the Administrator's promulgated rules and
published decisions in making their rulings. Capricious decisionmaking
has resulted.
231 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2000).
232 40 C.F.R. § 22.1 (2006).
23 5 U.S.C. § 556(c) (2000).
234 Iran Air v. Kugelman, 996 F.2d 1253, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
235 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
236 Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing the Administrative Assessment of Civil
Penalties, 64 Fed. Reg. 40,138, 40,165 (July 23, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 22).
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1. Motions for Summary Disposition (Accelerated Decision)
By rule, the Administrator provides for summary disposition.237
Reviewing an initial decision in which an ALJ, without conducting an
evidentiary hearing, issued an accelerated decision finding a respondent
liable for violations of TSCA and the proposed penalty amount of$1.345
million appropriate, the Board stated that "we find that Newell's penalty
arguments fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact and that, conse-
quently, Newell was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing."23' The Board
consequently adopted the AUJ's initial decision as a final decision of the
Administrator.239 In other instances, the Board adopted an initial acceler-
ated decision of an ALJ as the final decision of the Administrator, issued
without conducting an evidentiary hearing, and assessed a civil penalty
on behalf of the Administrator.24 °
In a subsequent case, when the Administrator's enforcement staff
filed a motion for accelerated decision and the respondent failed to make
any answer to the motion, the AU denied the motion without citation to
the criteria of the Administrator's rule241 or agency precedent, which in-
cluded In re Green Thumb Nursery, Inc., In re Newell Recycling Co., Inc.,
and In re Spitzer Great Lakes, Ltd. 242 The Administrator's enforcement
237 See 40 C.F.R. § 22.20(a) (2006) (describing "accelerated decisions"); see also id.
§ 22.20(b)(2) (2006) (describing the Presiding Officer's determination ofmaterial facts for
a "partial accelerated decision"). In a final accelerated decision of the Administrator assess-
ing penalties, citing Supreme Court precedent on the analogous "summary judgment"
provision in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56, the Board noted that "a party
waives its right to an adjudicatory hearing where it fails to dispute the material facts upon
which the agency's decision rests," and that "[t]he constitutional right to due process
requires that the person claiming the benefit of that due process must first place some
relevant matter into dispute." In Re Green Thumb Nursery, Inc., 6 E.A.D. 782, 792
(March 6, 1997).
21 In re Newell Recycling Co., Inc., 8 E.A.D. 598, 625 (1999).
239 Id. at 643.
24o See In re Spitzer Great Lakes, Ltd., 9 E.A.D. 302 (2000) ($165,000 penalty); see also
In re Green Thumb Nursery, Inc., 6 E.A.D. 782 (1997) ($3,000 penalty).
241 40 C.F.R. § 22.20 (2006).
242 In re Ritchie Eng'g Co.,Inc., U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency No. CAA-5-2000-019, 1 (Apr. 19,
2001) (order). In his order, without citation to the criteria of 40 C.F.R. § 22.20(a), or any
other legal authority, the AT denied the unopposed motion, asserting that documents
relied upon in making the motion "are proposed exhibits only" and "are not yet a part of
the evidentiary record." Id. He went on: "Indeed, whether the proposed exhibits ever be-
come part of the record here, and the weight to be accorded to them, remains to be seen. In
that regard, these proposed exhibits may be rejected at hearing, EPA may decide to not
offer them into evidence, or they may be explained away by respondent." Id.
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staff sought interlocutory review of the ALJ's order pursuant to 40 C.F.R.
§ 22.29, arguing in its brief before the Board that the ALJ failed to apply
the clear law of the agency, as set out in the Administrator's Rules, specifi-
cally 40 C.F.R. § 22.20, and numerous final decisions of the Administrator,
including In re Green Thumb Nursery, Inc., In re Newell Recycling Co.,
Inc., and In re Spitzer Great Lakes, Ltd.243
Obviously, as Ritchie Engineering Company made no response at
all to the motion, it could not have identified any genuine issue of material
fact in response to the motion. Enforcement staff emphasized that if the
ALJ's order was allowed to stand, Ritchie Engineering Company would
be granted a hearing notwithstanding its failure to raise a genuine issue
of material fact, when Green Thumb Nursery, Newell Recycling Company
and Spitzer Great Lakes had been denied a hearing for the failure to raise
such an issue, and that "inconsistency undermines the even-handed appli-
cation of law that is essential to the integrity of the adjudicative process
under 40 C.F.R. Part 22." 244 The Board denied interlocutory review in an
order consisting of two sentences:
By motion filed June 1, 2001, U.S. EPA Region 5 seeks
interlocutory review of an order of the Presiding Officer in
this proceeding denying the Regions' motion for accelerated
decision as to liability. Upon review, the Region's motion for
interlocutory review is hereby denied.245
The Board provided no further explanation for its decision.
While it had the initial decision in In re Ritchie Engineering Co.
under review, the Board issued a final decision in another matter which
involved a respondent's failure to file a response to a motion for acceler-
ated decision.246 On appeal of the initial decision before the Board, Billy
Yee challenged the enforceability of the environmental rule he was found
to have violated.247 The Board noted that Respondent "did not file any
24 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Interlocutory Review, In re Ritchie Eng'g Co.,
Inc., U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency No. CAA-5-2000-019, 1 (Apr. 19, 2001) Ritchie Eng'g Co.,
4 (June 1, 2001).
244 Id. at 15-16. In support of its argument, enforcement staff cited both Santise v.
Schweiker, 676 F.2d. 925, 930 (1982), and Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444
F.2d. 841, 851 (1970).2451In re Ritchie Eng'g Co., Inc., U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency No. CAA-5-2000-019, 1 (Apr. 19,
2001) (July 6, 2001) (order denying interlocutory appeal).
241 In re Billy Yee, 10 E.A.D. 1 (2001).
247 Id. at 8.
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formal opposition" to enforcement staffs motion for accelerated decision
on the issue of liability, and that the ALJ "thus concluded that Appellant
had waived any objection to the granting of the motion and ruled that the
[Administrator's delegated complainant] was entitled to judgment as a mat-
ter of law" on Billy Yee's liability for the violations alleged.' s After explain-
ing that accelerated decision in the Administrator's penalty assessment
process "'is governed by an administrative summary judgment standard,
requiring the timely presentation of a genuine and material factual dispute,
similar to judicial summary judgment,"' citing, among other authorities,
In re Green Thumb Nursery, Inc., the Board stated:
[the Administrator's] Rule 22.16(b) . . . provides, in
pertinent part, '[any party who fails to respond within
the designated period waives any objection to the granting
of the motion.' 40 C.F.R. § 22.16(b) (2000). Accordingly, by
failing to raise the enforceability of the Disclosure Rule
argument before the Presiding Officer in connection with
the Partial Accelerated Decision, Appellant waived it both
below and for purposes of review.249
Given that, on May 29, 2001, Billy Yee's failure to provide any
response to a motion for accelerated decision was found, under criteria
of the Administrator's Rules and his published decisions, to constitute
a waiver of any issue Billy Yee could have raised therein, subjecting him
to a judgement as to liability for violations alleged, there would appear to
be no reason for the Administrator's process, on July 6, 2001, to make a
different ruling against Ritchie Engineering Company for its failure to pro-
vide any response to a motion for accelerated decision. By allowing the
AUJ's ruling in In re Ritchie Engineering Co. to stand, a ruling based upon
criteria completely at odds with the precedent cited in In re Billy Yee, the
Board sanctioned inconsistent results for similarly situated respondents
appearing before the Administrator.
2. Determining a Violator's Ability to Pay a Particular Penalty
Amount
Under most federal environmental statues, Congress requires that,
in determining an appropriate amount of civil penalty, the Administrator
24S Id. at 10.
24 9 1d. at 10-11.
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consider the violator's financial status and ability to pay a particular
amount of civil penalty."' A review of the Administrator's final decisions
manifests capriciousness in addressing this penalty criteria.
On behalf of the Administrator, the Board has held that, to fulfill
the Administrator's obligation to take into account the "ability to pay" statu-
tory penalty criteria in a specific case, when his enforcement staff issues
a complaint under his authority, "a respondent's ability to pay may be
presumed," and that presumption can continue until the respondent's
ability to pay the proposed penalty "is put at issue by a respondent.""' As
under the Administrator's Rules, a respondent is required in his answer
to include his "basis for opposing any proposed relief' and any hearing
requested is to be "upon the issues raised by the complaint and answer,"2 2
if the respondent would claim he has an inability to pay the proposed
penalty, he must raise the issue in his answer.5 3 The Board further held
that, where the respondent does raise such a claim, the Administrator's
delegated complainant "must be given access to the respondent's financial
records before the start of [any] such hearing."254 If the respondent does
not "raise its ability to pay as an issue in its answer," or if after having
raised the claim, it "fails to produce any evidence to support an inability to
pay claim after being apprised of that obligation during the pre-hearing
process," it may be concluded that "any objection to the penalty based upon
ability to pay has been waived under the Agency's procedural rules."25 5
It must be emphasized that in the procedure which it delineated in
In re New Waterbury, Ltd., the Board did not relieve the Administrator's
enforcement staff of any burden that it has at hearing, imposed by the
APA25 ' and by the Administrator's Rules.257 The Board did recognize that
the Administrator, by rule, requires that to preserve for hearing a claim
on its ability to pay the penalty amount proposed in the complaint, a
respondent must provide notice to the agency by raising the issue in its
answer. 2 1 If a respondent does raise this issue, it must submit for the
250 See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (2000); TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)(B) (2000);
FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 1361(a)(4) (2000); EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 11045(b)(1)(C) (2000); CAA, 42
U.S.C. § 7413(e)(1) (2000).
211 In re New Waterbury, Ltd., 5 E.A.D. 529, 541 (1994).
252 40 C.F.R. § 22.15(b)-(c) (2006).
... In re New Waterbury, Ltd., 5 E.A.D. at 542.
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2000).
257 40 C.F.R. § 22.24 (2006).
25' 40 C.F.R. § 22.15(a) (2006).
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Administrator's enforcement staffs review "financial records before the
start of [any] such hearing."259 After a financial analyst retained by the
Administrator reviews financial documents submitted by respondent and
reports to enforcement staff, if the matter goes to hearing, the Adminis-
trator's enforcement staff continues to bear the burden of demonstrating
the penalty amount proposed is appropriate considering the respondent's
ability to pay as disclosed in its financial records. If the respondent fails to
raise the issue in its answer, or having raised the issue, refuses or other-
wise fails to submit financial documentation upon which its claim can be
determined, the respondent may by rule be deemed to have waived its claim
on the issue.26 °
259 In re New Waterbury, Ltd., 5 E.A.D. at 542. Prior to August 23, 1999, the Administrator
required, by rule, that notices of the proposed penalty order-identified in his rules as
complaints-set forth the amount of civil penalty proposed for the violations alleged. 40
C.F.R. § 22.14(a)(4) (1998). Subsequent to that date, the Administrator amended his rules
and removed that requirement, which permitted enforcement staff to issue notices of his
proposed penalty orders without identifying a specific penalty amount. Consolidated Rules
of Practice Governing the Administrative Assessment of Civil Penalties, 64 Fed. Reg.
40,138, 40,152 (July 23, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 22). He did state that "EPA expects
that administrative complaints containing specific penalty proposals will continue to be
a central part of the Agency's administrative enforcement program." Id. Obviously, if the
Administrator's enforcement staff issues a notice of his proposed penalty order, i.e., com-
plaint, that does not identify the penalty amount proposed for the violations alleged, the
process identified in In re New Waterbury, Ltd. can have no efficacy. Where an agency's
rules allow for the resolution of issues on pleadings,
the contents of the response are of critical importance, and the need for
and importance of the response in turn enhances the significance of the
notice given the adverse party. In order to be adequate, such notice given
by the agency to an adverse party must contain enough information to
provide the respondent a genuine opportunity to identify material issues
of fact. This is needful to provide the 'due notice and opportunity for
hearing' required by the [APA].
Hess & Clark, Div. of Rhodia, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 495 F.2d 975, 983 (D.C. Cir.
1974). If an alleged violator is not given notice of the amount of penalty proposed for his
alleged violations, it hardly can be said that he has been given a genuine opportunity to
determine whether he has an ability to pay a particular penalty amount. Id.
26 See In re New Waterbury, Ltd., 5 E.A.D. at 541-42. A determination of whether a party
is able to pay a particular penalty amount is a conclusion. The probative facts upon which
such a conclusion will be based consist of records documenting the party's financial con-
dition. Although not cited by the Board in In re New Waterbury, Ltd., it must be noted that
the process which it identified is supported by well-recognized principles of sound decision-
making. "The ordinary rule, based on considerations of fairness, does not place the burden
upon a litigant of establishing facts peculiarly within the knowledge of his adversary."
United States v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 355 U.S. 253, 256 n.5 (1957).
"Ordinarily a litigant does not have the burden of establishing facts peculiarly within the
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As to some respondents before the Administrator, this is the law
that has been applied. The Board adopted in a final decision of the Admin-
istrator an AI's ruling that the respondent waived its ability to pay claim,
as the respondent, despite providing some financial documentation, failed
to produce the last five years of its parent corporation's income tax re-
turns.261 The ALJ, on motion of the Administrator's enforcement staff,
had ordered the respondent to produce the returns so that the AUJ could
make a determination of respondent's ability to pay.262 In another matter,
the Board adopted in the Administrator's final decision an AJ's ruling
that a respondent had waived an initial claim that paying the penalty
amount proposed would "cause a financial hardship that would cause the
company to go out of business," as the respondents "did not raise the ability
to pay argument again, nor did they provide financial records.., despite
court [AIU] orders and Complainant requests for such information."263
Notwithstanding the soundness of the ability to pay determina-
tions in these final decisions of the Administrator, based upon In re New
Waterbury, Ltd., the Board also has chosen to allow AUJs the discretion to
make ability to pay determinations without regard to the Administrator's
Rules and the precedent it has adopted on behalf of the Administrator in
knowledge of the opposing party." Browzin v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 527 F. 2d 843, 849
(D.C. Cir. 1975). In upholding a regulation of the Secretary of the Interior requiring a mine
owner to come forward with information regarding his mine when challenging an imminent
danger order issued under the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted that "[a]s respondents logically say, it is, after all,
his mine and he had the best knowledge of its condition." Old Ben Coal Corp. v. Interior Bd.
of Mine Operation Appeals, 523 F.2d 25, 36 (7th Cir. 1975). "Simply stated, the [adverse
inference] rule provides that when a party has relevant evidence within his control which
he fails to produce, that failure gives rise to an inference that the evidence is unfavorable
to him." Int'l Union v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1329, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also Newell
Recycling Co., Inc. v. EPA, 231 F.3d. 204, 210 (5th Cir. 1972) (as "[slurely Newell was in
possession of such information [of its ability to pay] if anyone was," and, as there was "'a
complete absence of evidence as to Newell's ability to pay'" in the record, the Administrator
.correctly declined to mitigate the penalty on the basis of Newell's putative inability to
pay it."); Bluestone Energy Design, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 74 F.3d 1288,
1295 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("Because Bluestone failed to present a satisfactory picture of its
financial status, it was not an abuse of discretion for the Commission to decline to consider
Bluestone's ability to pay."). Moreover, as financial records of a party are proprietary in
nature, sound policy warrants a rule that allows the party itself to determine whether it
might benefit from the release of such records, and whether it wishes to release its records.
261 In re Spitzer Great Lakes, Ltd. 9 E.A.D. 302, 306-07 (2000).
26 2 Id. at 319-20.
26 1 n re Roger Antkiewicz & Pest Elimination Prods. of Am., Inc., 8 E.A.D. 218, 240 (1999).
20071 107
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV.
these decisions. The Board has adopted such ability to pay determinations
in final decisions of the Administrator.
In one proceeding a respondent, Chempace Corporation, claimed
it did not have an ability to pay the penalty amount proposed in an admin-
istrative complaint filed on behalf of the Administrator. While, initially,
it provided financial documents to the Administrator's enforcement staff,
two years of negotiation yielded no settlement and a hearing was antici-
pated. Given the passage of time, the Administrator's enforcement staff
asked the ALJ to order the respondent to produce the two most recent years
of income tax returns and other financial records, and a financial expert
retained by the Administrator explained in a detailed affidavit accompa-
nying the discovery motion why she needed this information to conduct
an ability-to-pay analysis.2 4 Without any discussion of, or reference to, the
criteria of the Administrator's discovery rules and precedent, 26 5 the ALJ
denied the discovery motion.266 Having denied the Administrator's en-
forcement staff the prehearing production of the two most recent years
of Chempace's financial records, the AIU at hearing nonetheless permitted
the respondent's vice president to testify, without supporting documen-
tation, as to Chempace's financial status over those two years. 26" Based
upon that testimony, and the two-year-old documentation, the ALJ found
the respondent did not have an ability to pay the $200,000 penalty amount
proposed, but that $92,123 was an appropriate penalty amount.268
On review, the Board acknowledged that the ALJ "did not explicitly
recite the factors under 40 C.F.R. § 22.19(f)(1) in denying the [enforce-
ment staffs] request" for discovery,269 and "it may have been useful for the
[Administrator's enforcement staff] to review the specific detailed financial
information it sought in this case."270 In issuing the Administrator's final
21 In re Chempace Corp., 9 E.A.D. 119, 123-27 (2000).
26' For the current version of these rules, see 40 C.F.R. § 22.19 (2006).
2 66 In re Chempace Corp., 9 E.A.D. at 126-27.
2 6 7 Id. at 125. Enforcement staff made the discovery motion on December 10, 1997. Id. The
AU denied the motion on February 27, 1998. Id. at 126-27. The hearing was conducted
on April 7 and 8, 1998. Id. at 127.26 8 Id. at 121.
269 Id. at 135.
270 Id. at 134. At the time the AU made the decision, the Administrator's Rules provided
for 'other discovery" after the prehearing exchange upon an A.'s determination that such
discovery will not in any way "unreasonably delay the proceeding"; the information sought
is "not otherwise obtainable"; and such information "has significant probative value." 40
C.F.R. § 22.19(e)(1) (1998). The Board quoted the reasons given by the AL for denying the
motion, as follows: "Chempace had'already produced five years' tax returns and financial
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decision, however, the Board would not reverse the AI's order denying a
discovery request for the two most recent years of Chempace Corporation's
financial records, as "it appears from our reading of the reasons given by
the Presiding Officer for denying the [motion] ... that such further dis-
covery would not necessarily have 'significant probative value,"' and, in the
Board opinion, the ALJ had not abused his discretion.2 '
A ruling on a discovery motion is an issue of law and should be
based on whether the party's written discovery request meets the criteria
of the Administrator's rule,272 not whether a particular witness's testimony
is credible. The determination of an appropriate penalty amount is an issue
of law, policy, and agency discretion, not fact.273 Furthermore, on matters
of law and policy, an ALJ is subordinate to the Administrator.27 4 Despite
these rules, the Board said that "[a] ffording considerable deference to a
Presiding Officer's discovery ruling is particularly appropriate where the
issue involved is the amount of the penalty, an issue for which the Presiding
Officer has broad discretion."27 The Board adopted the ALJ's initial decision
as the final decision of the Administrator, and assessed a $92,123 penalty.2 76
In In re CDT Landfill Corp., the Administrator's enforcement staff
filed a complaint which alleged four counts of CAA violations, and proposed
that a $72,380 penalty amount be assessed for those violations. 277 The AIU
issued an initial decision finding CDT Landfill liable for three of the four
statements .... If the additional undisclosed documents are shown at the hearing to be
relevant to the penalty assessment, adverse inferences could be drawn against [Chempace's]
position." In re Chempace Corp., 9 E.A.D. at 135. The rationale of the AL incorporated no
consideration of the criteria identified by the Administrator in his rule.
271 In re Chempace Corp., 9 E.A.D. at 135.
272 40 C.F.R. § 22.19(e) (2006).
273 See In re Chautauqua Hardware Corporation, 3 E.A.D. 616, 623 (1991); see also
Panhandle Coop. Ass'n v. EPA, 771 F.2d. 1149, 1152 (8th Cir. 1985).
274 See supra note 24.271 In re Chempace Corp., 9 E.A.D. at 135. The Board does not reconcile its finding that the
specific detailed financial information the Administrator's enforcement staff sought to
review may have been useful with its adoption of what it identified as the AlJ's reason
for excluding that very same information: the information "would not necessarily have
'significant probative value." Id. Also, the Board does not explain why, if the testimony of
Chempace Corporation's vice president regarding the company's financial circumstances
over the two years prior to hearing was not only admissible, but conclusive on the issue
of Chempace Corporation's ability to pay the penalty amount proposed, copies of actual
financial records supporting that testimony "would not necessarily have 'significant
probative value.'" Id.276 Id. at 143.
277 In re CDT Landfill Corp., 11 E.A.D. 88, 97 (2003).
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violations alleged, but assessed no penalty as he found it without an ability
to pay any penalty."' The Board adopted the ALJ's initial decision as the
final decision of the Administrator.279 The Board acknowledged that CDT
Landfill had not raised an ability to pay claim in the answer it filed, and
identified no effort by the respondent to amend its answer to include that
claim. 280 The Board cited the AIf's pre-hearing order, identifying the follow-
ing language regarding CDT Landfill's pre-hearing exchange obligations:
"[i]f CDT is contending that the proposed penalty exceeds its ability to pay
or would jeopardize its ability to continue in business, [it must] provide
financial statements, copies of income tax returns or other data to support
such contention [by June 2, 20001.281
The Board further acknowledged that CDT Landfill "did not address
in its prehearing exchange the issue of its ability to pay a penalty and did
not provide any additional financial statements to support such an inability-
to-pay argument."2 2 The Board made no mention of any effort by CDT
Landfill to amend its prehearing exchange identifying newly discovered evi-
dence.2" Having failed to "raise its ability to pay as an issue in its answer,"
and having failed to allow enforcement staff "access to [its] financial records
before the start of [any] such hearing,"2 4 CDT Landfill clearly did not
meet the requirements set out in the Administrator's Rules and published
decisions to raise an inability to pay claim at issue at hearing. Moreover,
the Administrator, through the Board, has held "that a respondent's ability
to pay may be presumed until it is put at issue by a respondent."2" There-
fore, consistent with In re New Waterbury, Ltd., In re Spitzer Great Lakes,
Ltd. and In re RogerAntkiewicz & Pest Elimination Products ofAmerica,
Inc., in determining an appropriate amount of penalty for its violations, the
presiding ALJ and the Board should have presumed that CDT Landfill
278 Id. at 98-99.
279 Id. at 125.
28 0 Id. at 97.
211 Id. at 98.
282Id.
"
3 Notwithstanding CDT Landfill Corporation's failure to raise the issue of its ability to pay
in its answer, in communication with enforcement staff prior to the filing of the Complaint,
it appears to have submitted "three financial schedules" represented by its attorney to have
.estimated CDT's current financial status."Id. at 97. The Board acknowledged, however,
that this information "appears to fall somewhat short of the financial documentation
contemplated by the AI's Prehearing Order," and that it was "not part of the evidence
adduced at hearing." Id. at 98 n.17.
" In re New Waterbury, Ltd., 5 E.A.D. 529, 542 (1994).
285 Id. at 541.
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could afford to pay the penalty amount proposed or that it had waived any
claim regarding its ability to pay a penalty. This is not what happened.
On January 8, 2001, nine days prior to the scheduled hearing,
CDT Landfill submitted to the Administrator's enforcement staff a CDT
Landfill Corporation "Combined Balance Sheet as of September 30, 2000"
("Combined Balance Sheet")." 6 This document consisted of one page.28 7
At the hearing, over objection of enforcement staff, the ALJ admitted the
document into evidence.8 The Board noted that "the Combined Balance
Sheet ultimately and significantly influenced [the ALJ's] penalty anal-
ysis," in that the ALJ cited it "as the only evidence in the record of CDT's
financial condition."28 9 Identifying the balance sheet as evidence of CDT
Landfill's financial hardship, the ALJ held that the "' [c] omplainant ha [d]
totally failed to carry its burden of persuasion as to CDT's ability to pay,'"
and, "[flor those reasons, he declined to assess any civil penalty against
CDT" for the three counts of violation he found proven.29°
Although it adopted the ALJ's ruling that CDT Landfill, at hearing,
could proceed on an ability to pay claim and have the issue determined
in its favor on doing nothing more than presenting a one page financial
summary first tendered nine days prior to the hearing, the Board provided
no analysis to demonstrate how it was that CDT Landfill could be found to
have met its prehearing obligations under the Administrator's Rules and
the precedent of his final decisions.291 Rather than evaluate the AA's ruling
in consideration of legal precedent, the Board deferred to the ALJ: "we
find that the AUJ did not abuse his discretion in admitting the Combined
Balance Sheet at the evidentiary hearing. "292
28
.In re CDT Landfill Corp., 11 E.A.D. at 98.2 8 7 Id. at 112.
288 Id. at 105.
289 Id.
290 Id. at 100.
291 See 40 C.F.R. § 22.15 (2006) (noting that a respondent must raise the issue of its ability
to pay in its answer so as to make it subject matter for hearing); see also In re New
Waterbury, Ltd., 5 E.A.D. 529, 542 (1994) ("[11n any case where ability to pay is put in
issue, the [Administrator's enforcement staff] must be given access to the respondent's
financial records before the start of such hearing.").2192 Id. at 125. Careful analysis reveals that the prehearing order of the AIU itself was not
in accordance with law. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000). As we have seen, relevant agency law
is that hearings are to be "upon the issues raised by the complaint and answer." 40 C.F.R.
§ 22.15(c) (2006). (a respondent must raise an issue in its answer so as to make it subject
matter for hearing. This section does not specifically address the ability to pay issue, but
rather sets forth a general pleading requirement placed on respondents.). Also, "a respon-
dent's ability to pay may be presumed until it is put at issue by a respondent." In re New
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The Board noted it "has many times stated that it will generally not
substitute its judgment for that of an ALJ absent a showing that the AU
committed clear error or an abuse of discretion in assessing a penalty."29 3
As to the Combined Balance Sheet, the Board stated that "[w]e have also
emphasized that '[tihe admission of evidence is a matter particularly within
the discretion of the administrative law judge."294 In reaffirming its desire
to defer to the assigned ALJ on evidentiary rulings, the Board described
its relationship with the ALJ as analogous to a federal reviewing court's
relationship with an agency by stating, "[fl ederal district and circuit courts
have similarly recognized agency discretion in making evidentiary decisions
during administrative proceedings."295
Waterbury, Ltd., 5 E.A.D. at 541. CDT Landfill failed to raise the ability to pay issue as
required by the Administrator's Rules and published decisions. On the record of the
pleadings, CDT Landfill's ability to pay was not at issue and was to be presumed, given
that agency precedent governs AU decisionmaking. See Iran Air v. Kugelman, 996 F.2d
1253, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Notwithstanding CDT Landfill's failure to comply with the
Administrator's requirements for raising the issue, and the clear agency precedent, the
AI chose to issue an order informing CDT Landfill that it continued to have the option of
raising the ability to pay issue by providing loosely specified financial information in its
future prehearing exchange. In re CDT Landfill Corp., 11 E.A.D. at 99-100. Consequently,
the AlUs prehearing order was not in accordance with law.
293In re CDT Landfill Corp., 11 E.A.D. at 117.294 Id. at 108.
295 Id. It must be observed that the evidentiary issue is one of law, not of fact. The issue is
whether a one page summary can ever be probative on the issue of a respondent's ability
to pay if the respondent has failed to raise that issue, and failed to provide financial docu-
ments to support the conclusions of the tendered summary and an ability to pay claim prior
to the hearing. Had the Board "exercise [d] its own judgment" in identifying a legal rationale
for the admission of the one page summary, "according to its own understanding and con-
science," U. S. of Am. Ex Rel. Joseph Accardi, 347 U.S. at 266-67, rather than deferring
to the ALJ, it would have had a difficult time of it. In addition to the Respondent's failure
to raise the "ability to pay" issue in its answer, and to provide its financial records prior
to hearing, the Board acknowledged that the AU had "not specifically address [ed] the [one
page summary's] reliability at the hearing"; that the document itself was "undated and
had not been further explained by testimony,"; and that "there was no analysis or expla-
nation for the 'very large closure cost liability' referenced in the document." In re CDT
Landfill Corp., 11 E.A.D. at 113.
Moreover, in considering the probative value of summaries, federal courts have
recognized that "[tihe proponent of a summary must establish a foundation that (1) the
underlying materials upon which the summary is based are admissible in evidence; and
(2) the underlying documents were made available to the opposing party for inspection."
Paddack v. Dave Christensen, Inc., 745 F.2d 1254, 1259 (9th Cir. 1984). See also White
Indus., Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 611 F. Supp. 1049, 1077-78 (W.D. mo. 1985) (stating
that tendered testimony "in verbal summary form" of "personal examination of certain
documents" is an"unabashed attempt to prove the contents of document without producing
112 [Vol. 32:57
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The Board's attempted analogy is not in conformance with the law.
In contrast to a federal reviewing court's recognition of agency discretion,
based upon the court's limited role on review and an acknowledgment of
the agency's expertise,296 the APA explicitly provides that an ALJ is sub-
ordinate to the rules of the agency on matters of law.297 Furthermore, the
agency is specifically responsible for the contents of its final decisions,
with plenary authority to set aside an AUJ's ruling on issues of law,29
and the agency is obliged to issue decisions which are consistent and not
arbitrary and capricious.299
Two years after issuing In re CDT Landfill Corp., the Board issued
the Administrator's final decision in In re JHNY, Inc.300 In this decision, the
Board adopted a default order of the ALJ, issued on the failure of JHNY,
Inc., to submit a prehearing exchange as required by rule and the ALJ's
order.3" 1 In the Administrator's final decision, the Board cited In re CDT
Landfill Corp. not as precedent for the Board's interpretation of any rele-
vant rule, but rather as precedent for its deferential review standard re-
garding ALU decisionmaking, stating "it has been the Board's longstanding
practice to accord substantial deference to ALJs in conducting proceedings
under the [Administrator's Rules], particularly with regard to prehear-
ing exchange and discovery. As we have observed, '[olur rules depend on
the presiding officer to exercise discretion throughout an administrative
penalty proceeding."'
30 2
Although JHNY, Inc., had failed to submit a prehearing exchange,
it earlier had raised as an issue its ability to pay the penalty amount pro-
posed, and, prior to the ALA having ordered the prehearing exchange, vol-
untarily submitted to the Administrator's enforcement staff tax returns,
either the originals or appropriate copies thereof."). Whether CDT Landfill Corporation
made a sufficient foundation for its one page financial summary to be found probative and
admitted into evidence, consistent with 40 C.F.R. § 22.22(a) of the Administrator's Rules,
does not depend upon an evaluation of the demeanor of any witness, observed exclusively
by the ALU. It depends upon the persuasiveness of arguments supporting and opposing
the admission of the document, arguments as accessible to the Board on review as they
were to the AIU.
296 Brock v. Dow Chem. U.S.A., 801 F.2d. 926, 932 (7th Cir. 1986).
297 See 5 U.S.C. § 556(c) (2000); see also supra note 24.
298 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2000).
299 Id. § 706.
3 In re JHNY, Inc., 12 E.A.D. 372 (2005) (final order).
301 Id. at 374, 380.
302 Id. at 385.
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balance sheets and statements of operation." 3 Nonetheless, the Board
adopted the ALJ's ruling denying JHNY, Inc. a hearing, noting that "[bly
compelling the parties to provide [all evidence to be used at hearing and
other related information] in one central submission, the prehearing ex-
change clarifies the issues to be addressed at hearing and allows the parties
and the [AU] an opportunity for informed preparation for hearing."3 The
Board observed that JHNY, Inc. "did not provide information documenting
its financial condition as prescribed by the prehearing information exchange
requirements, and its failure to do so interfered with the purpose of the
[Administrator's Rules]."3°5 The Board specifically reaffirmed the ruling
of In re New Waterbury, Ltd.: "where a respondent does not raise its ability
to pay as an issue in its answer, or fails to produce any evidence to support
an inability to pay claim after being apprised of that obligation during the
pre-hearing process," the respondent may be found to have waived "any
objection to the penalty based upon ability to pay." °6
The rules and precedent that the Board, on behalf of the Adminis-
trator, identified and applied in JHNY, Inc., however, are rules and prece-
dent the Board ignored in assessing penalties against CDT Landfill, Inc.
and Chempace Corporation. As we have seen, CDT Landfill, Inc. failed
to raise the ability to pay issue in its answer, and, notwithstanding the
requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 22.19 and the ALJ's prehearing order, failed
to include any financial information in its prehearing exchange.0 7 Conse-
quently, if the precedent reaffirmed in In re JHNY, Inc. had been applied
by the Administrator's decision makers to In re CDT Landfill Corp., CDT
Landfill Corporation would have been found to have waived any ability to
pay claim it had, and its penalty amount could not have been reduced to
$0 based upon nothing more than a one-page unsigned Combined Balance
Sheet first submitted a week before the hearing. Regarding Chempace
Corporation, as the Administrator's Rules and In re New Waterbury, Ltd.
provide that, on having raised an ability to pay claim, a respondent must
"submit evidence to support i[ts claim as part of the pre-hearing exchange"
or may be deemed to have waived such a claim,"'8 it follows that the enforce-
ment staffs motion should have been granted over Chempace Corporation's
3o3 Id. at 379.
304 Id. at 382.3 05 Id. at 391.
306 Id. at 397 (citing In re New Waterbury, Ltd., 5 E.A.D. 529, 542 (1994)).
307 In re CDT Landfill Corp., 11 E.A.D. 88, 97 (2003).
"In re JHNY, Inc., 12 E.A.D. at 397.
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objection, and Chempace Corporation should have been ordered to provide
the two most recent years of its financial records. If Chempace Corporation
did not provide those records it would be deemed to have waived the claim.
Rather than consistently rule on the ability to pay issue based upon a
"conjunction of articulated standards and reflective findings, in furtherance
of even-handed application of law,"3 9 the Board has allowed the disposition
of cases to depend more upon which ALJ presided in the case.31°
Aside from the inconsistent outcomes on the ability to pay issue
manifested in these final decisions of the Administrator, the Board's
adoption of a deferential standard of review is itself inconsistent with
the position of the Administrator announced by his CJO in an earlier final
decision. The Board supports its adoption of the deferential review stan-
dard of an ALJ's decisionmaking by making an analogy to the deferential
standards applied by federal appellate courts when reviewing agency
decisions.31' Citing section 557(b) of the APA and case law, however, the
Administrator's CJO recognized that "[tlhe Administrator has the respon-
sibility for making final agency decisions, which comprehends the right to
review the entire record and draw his own conclusion from the evidence,"
and that "the relation between the ALJ and agency is not the same as or
even closely similar to the relation between agency and reviewing court."
312
The Board does not explain its departure from In re Martin Electronics,
Inc., nor does the Board explain how it can fulfill its obligation to the
Administrator to "assur[e] consistency in Agency adjudications by all of
the ALJs" and "assure that the final decisions represent with [sic] the
position of the Agency as a whole, rather than just the position of... one
Presiding Officer,"3 13 when it finds that an ALJ has the discretion to rule
on issues of law without regard to relevant precedent as set forth in
provisions of the Administrator's Rules and his published decisions.
309 Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d. 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
310 "When disposition depends more on which judge is assigned to the case than on the facts
or the legal rules, the tendency is to describe the system as lawless, arbitrary, or the like."
Santise v. Schweiker, 676 F.2d. 925,930 (1982) (citing Mashaw, Conflict and Compromise
Among Models of Administrative Justice, 1981 DUKE L.J. 181, 182 n.4. (1981).
"' In re CDT Landfill Corp., 11 E.A.D. at 108 ("Federal district and circuit courts have
similarly recognized agency discretion in making evidentiary decisions during adminis-
trative proceedings.").
311In re Martin Electronics, Inc. 2 E.A.D. 381,394-95 n. 18 (1987) (citing 3 KENNETH CULP
DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 17:16 (2d ed. 1980)).
313 Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing the Administrative Assessment of Civil
Penalties, 64 Fed. Reg. 40,138, 40,165 (July 23, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 22).
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CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The Supreme Court has long recognized that:
Our system ofjurisprudence rests on the assumption that
all individuals, whatever their position in government, are
subject to federal law:
'No man in this country is so high that he is
above the law. No officer of the law may set
that law at defiance with impunity. All the
officers of the government from the highest
to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and
are bound to obey it.'31 4
Consequently, agency decision makers must comply with governing statutes
and agency regulations. "It is axiomatic that an agency must act in accor-
dance with applicable statutes and its regulations," and "'It] he agency has
no discretion to deviate' from the procedure mandated by its regulatory
scheme."315 In Service v. Dulles, the United States Supreme Court sus-
tained the contention that "regulations validly prescribed by a govern-
ment administrator are binding upon him as well as the citizen, and that
this principle holds even when the administrative action under review
is discretionary in nature."31 6 Similarly, in Tennessee Valley Authority v.
Whitman, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals criticized actions of the
Administrator regarding a compliance order because the Board and the
presiding ALJ "manufactured the procedures they employed on the fly,
entirely ignoring the concept of the rule of law," and applied agency rules
"on a purely ad hoc basis.
Moreover, procedures established by Congress, and by executive
officers vested with authority by Congress to establish procedures, cannot
be set aside by anyone with a preconceived idea that procedure should be
314 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,506 (1978) (citing United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196,
220 (1882)).
315 Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. West, 138 F.3d 1434, 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing
Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 544 (1988)). See also Associated Builders &
Contractors of Tex. Gulf Coast Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 451 F.Supp. 281,287 (S.D. Tex.
1978) ("[it is also true that individual government agents cannot escape adherence to
governmental regulations.").
316 Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 372 (1957).
317 Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236, 1246 (11th Cir. 2003).
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something other than that identified by Congress and responsible chief
executive officers. Again, according to the Supreme Court: "[wihen a statute
limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes the negative
of any other mode."31 Consequently, when Congress specifies the process
that is to govern penalty assessment and agency adjudications, as it has in
the federal environmental statutes and section 554 of the APA, its specifi-
cation of the identified process includes the negative of any other mode
of process.319
The law governing the Administrator's assessment of civil penalties
for violations of the federal environmental statutes is clear:
(a) The only person authorized by Congress to assess,
and determine the amount of, civil penalties for
violations of the federal environmental statutes is
the Administrator,32 ° the Administrator has promul-
gated rules to govern the process by which he will
exercise his discretion to do so,32 ' and he has issued
policies to guide those who participate in his civil
penalty assessment process.322
(b) Congress has vested authority in ALJs only to
initially decide a matter on behalf of an agency323 -
in the circumstances under discussion, the agency
being the Administrator-and provided that deci-
sionmaking of an ALJ shall be subject to the law
and policy of the agency.324
318 Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929). See also Nat'l R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974).
319 This canon of statutory construction also applies to the interpretation of the Admin-
istrator's rules and regulations. Rucker v. Wabash R.R. Co., 418 F.2d 146, 149 (7th Cir.
1969) ("[a] dministrative regulations, like statutes, must be construed by courts, and the
same rules of interpretation are applicable in both cases."). Consequently, when the Admin-
istrator's Rules "limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes the negative
of any other mode." Botany Worsted Mills, 278 U.S. at 289. For instance, when the
Administrator, by rule and published decisions, identifies three criteria which an AIJ
must consider in determining whether to grant a motion for summary disposition and
deny an oral evidentiary hearing, an AIJ cannot ignore those criteria and rule on such
a motion based upon different criteria more to his own personal liking.32
1 See supra Part I.B.1.
321 See supra Part II.
322 See supra note 70.
323 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2000).
324 Id. § 556(c).
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(c) Congress has provided that the agency, i.e. the
Administrator, is responsible for the contents of its
final decisions, 325 and it has provided that a review-
ing court shall hold unlawful final agency decisions
found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of dis-
cretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.326
Rather than recognize in the process established by Congress that
it is the Administrator who is vested with the exclusive authority to assess
and to determine civil penalties for violations of the federal environmental
statutes, the Board in its decisions has taken the position that each of the
several ALJs assess civil penalties under these statutes, and in determin-
ing the amount of penalty to assess, each ALJ is independent. The Board
has stated that in determining the amount of penalty to assess, the ALJ
"has a choice of either following or deviating from" the Administrator's
penalty policies, which choice "operates to preserve not restrict the [ALJ's]
independence[;]" 327 that an AU can "reject[] an 'appropriate' penalty gener-
ated in accordance with the [Administrator's] [p] enalty [p] olicy, in favor
of another 'appropriate' penalty" amount the ALJ finds "better suited to
the circumstances of [the] particular case [y"32' and that, given an "AL's
authority to assess a penalty," the Administrator's policy "does not limit
the ALJ's authority to assess a penalty that is otherwise in accordance
with the statutory factors."329
The Board's position does not account for the language of the fed-
eral environmental statutes and the APA, as well as efforts made by the
Administrator to assure that his final decisionmaking will be in confor-
mance with applicable requirements of those statutes. The Administrator
requires AI.Js to consider various penalty policies when determining appro-
priate penalty amounts in their initial decisions for violations of the federal
environmental statutes. 330 The policies are the Administrator's interpre-
tations of statutory penalty criteria which Congress, in the federal environ-
mental statutes, directs the Administrator to consider in determining
32 5 Id. § 557(b).
326 Id. § 706.
327 In re DIC Ams, Inc., 6 E.A.D. 184, 190-91 (1995).
3 281In re Employers Ins. Of Wausau & Group Eight Tech., Inc., 6 E.A.D. 735, 759 (1997).
121 In re U.S. Army, Fort Wainwright Cent. Heating & Power Plant, 11 E.A.D. 126, 172
(2003).
330 40 C.F.R. § 22.27(b) (2006).
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penalty amounts he will assess.33' These policies, issued by senior officers
to whom he has delegated his policy-making authority, incorporate the
Administrator's adopted methodologies for determining penalty amounts.
The Administrator's use of such policies is based upon sound observation:
the "consistent application of a penalty policy" is necessary "because other-
wise the resulting penalties might be seen as being arbitrarily assessed,"
and "[tireating similar situations in a similar fashion is central to the
credibility of EPA's enforcement effort."332 Is it not true that, in determining
appropriate penalty amounts for violations of the federal environmental
statutes, treating similar situations in a similar fashion is necessary to
assure that penalty amounts assessed by the Administrator against vio-
lators will be in conformance with section 706 of the APA,333 and not be
arbitrary or capricious? Rather than act upon its responsibility to the
Administrator for assuring consistency in the Administrator's adjudications,
and "assur[ing] that final decisions represent with [sic] the position of
the Agency as a whole, rather than just the position of... one Presiding
Officer,"334 the Board has "many times stated that it will generally not
substitute its judgment for that of an AUJ absent a showing that the ALJ
committed clear error or an abuse of discretion in assessing a penalty."335
While on occasion the Board has articulated the need for apply-
ing the Administrator's policies, and used the policies to support penalty
amounts assessed in some final decisions of the Administrator,336 the Board
has been equally willing to adopt in other final decisions of the Adminis-
trator penalty determinations of an ALT where the AI's determination is
based upon the statutory criteria rather than the Administrator's policy;337
where the ALJ's determination fails to recognize the existence of the
Administrator's policy;33 where the ALJ's determination results from his
finding that the Administrator's policy is "arbitrary and unauthorized by
the statute;"339 and where the Board openly recognizes that the ALT "failed
331 See supra note 12.
332 POLICY GM-22, supra note 70, at 27.
333 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
31 Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing the Administrative Assessment of Civil
Penalties, 64 Fed. Reg. 40,138, 40,165 (July 23, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 22).3351 In re CDT Landfill Corp., 11 E.A.D. 88, 117 (2003).33
1 See supra notes 148-49.
337 In re V-1 Oil Co., 8 E.A.D. 729, 753 (2000).
331 In re John A. Capozzi, 11 E.A.D. 10, 38-39 (2003).
31 In re Hall Signs, Inc., U.S. Envt' Prot. Agency No. 5-EPCRA-96-026, 8 (Oct. 30, 1997)
(initial decision).
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to discuss, or even mention, the Agency penalty policy,"34 ° that his penalty
determination "does not fully conform to the regulatory requirements,"34'
and that the Board does not endorse the ALJ's determination.342 From the
language of its decisions, it appears that the Board, as well as the ALJs
assigned to the agency, have overlooked a fundamental and distinctive
principle of the statutory administrative process: all authority exercised
in the Administrator's penalty assessment process, whether by delegated
complainants, ALJs, or the Board, is authority held by the Administrator
and assigned to these officers, and, as a consequence of the assignment,
each officer acts subject to the Administrator's law and policy. 34 3
The effect of this principle can be illustrated readily. The federal
environmental statutes require that before the Administrator may assess
a penalty, which the Administrator must determine by evaluating the
evidence in consideration of the statutory penalty criteria, the Admin-
istrator must provide to the alleged violator a notice of the proposed
penalty order.3 Both the Administrator's delegated complainant signing
a notice of the proposed penalty order and the Board issuing the final
order assessing civil penalties are each delegated authority to so act from
the very same Administrator.345 An ALJ's authority to preside over the
31°In re F.R. & S, Inc., U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency Appeal No. CAA 03-2002-0215, 2 (March
17, 2005) (order).
341 Id. at 1.
342 Id. at 3.
" Although ALJs are independent fact-finders and initial decision makers by statute of
Congress, they are subordinate to the Administrator on matters of law and policy. See
supra note 24. The Board is subordinate to the Administrator as the Board is a creation
of the Administrator. See 57 Fed. Reg 5320 (Feb. 13, 1992). The Administrator's dele-
gated complainants and enforcement staff, who issue and prosecute his notices of proposed
penalty orders (i.e., complaints), are subordinate by virtue of the delegation.
' See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(4) (2000); TSCA 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)(A) (2000);
FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 1361(a)(3) (2000); EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 11045(b)(1)(B) (2000); CAA 42
U.S.C. § 7413(d)(2) (2000); SDWA 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(g)(3) (2000); MPRSA, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1415(a) (2000); SWDA, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(2) (2000).
345 The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia described the exercise of the
Office of Thrift Supervision's statutory enforcement process, which also is governed by
the APA, as follows:
A notice of charges may be issued when the agency has 'reasonable cause to
believe' that the respondent is engaging in unsafe or unsound practices or is
otherwise violation the law. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1). The notice is in the nature
of a complaint. In issuing a notice, the OTS Director is performing a prosecutorial
function. Ultimately, the Director may perform a different role in the same case,
acting as a quasi-judicial officer passing judgment on the evidence bearing on the
charges. Although the Administrative Procedure Act generally forbids agency
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litigation of an action, and to issue initial decisions, is assigned by the
same Administrator.346
The penalty amount found appropriate in the initial decision of an
AU and the penalty amount assessed in the final decision of the Board
may differ from that proposed by the Administrator's delegated complain-
ant. Reasons for this may be that evidence in the final record differs from
that relied upon when the complaint was prepared and issued, or the
Administrator's delegated complainant incorrectly applied the policy. If
consistent, non-arbitrary, and non-capricious agency action is the goal,
however, it is irrational for the Administrator to provide one interpretation
of the statutory penalty criteria and a penalty determination methodology
for proposing penalty amounts to assess, yet allow other differing interpre-
tations and methodologies, or no interpretation and methodology at all,
for use in determining penalty amounts the Administrator will actually
assess. Likewise, if consistent, non-arbitrary, and non-capricious decision-
making is the goal, it is irrational to adopt in final decisions of the Admin-
istrator penalty amount determinations made by each of the ALJs based
upon their own personal notions of statutory interpretation, policy and
fairness, ignoring or rejecting the Administrator's statutory interpretations
and adopted penalty calculation methodologies set out in his policies.
The Administrator is also responsible for all rulings of law made
in the administrative record out of which the final decision issues. When
rulings on points of law-for example, whether an issue has been properly
raised for hearing; whether summary disposition is appropriate; whether
prerequisites have been met by a party so as to enable it to have infor-
mation introduced into evidence-are not made by applying the criteria
of the Administrator's promulgated rules and published decisions, but are
made based upon a particular ALJ's personal notions of fairness, any
personnel from engaging in both the prosecution and the decision of a case, an
exemption permits a member of the body comprising the agency to wear both
hats.
Doolin Sec. Sav. Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 139 F.3d 203, 212 n.8 (D.C. Cir.
1998)(citations ommitted). Likewise, in the federal environmental statutes, Congress
provides that "the Administrator"- who, as we have seen, is the "agency" under the
APA-is to issue both the "notice" of the proposed penalty order, and issue the final order
"assessing" the penalty, determining the amount of penalty in consideration of the
statutory penalty criteria identified by Congress. See supra Part I(B)(1) and note 20. The
exemption, in part, reads as follows: "This subsection does not apply ... (C) to the agency
or a member or members of the body comprising the agency." 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2)(C).
34 40 C.F.R. §§ 22.4(c), 22.27(a) (2006).
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inconsistencies, i.e., arbitrary and capricious rulings, are the responsibility
of the Administrator.34 v
Inconsistencies in statutory interpretation and penalty calculation
methodologies applied by decision makers in determining appropriate pen-
alties to be assessed by the Administrator, and inconsistencies in criteria
applied by ALJs in ruling on issues raised in litigation, cannot be written
off to the unavoidable diversity in views of each of the several decision
makers as, by section 557(b) of the APA, Congress makes the Administrator
responsible for all final decisions, allowing him to reject in whole or in
part any finding or conclusion in any initial decision of an ALJ. 348 More-
over, in section 706 of the APA, Congress requires that the Administrator's
final decisions be consistent and not arbitrary and capricious.349 Again,
the Administrator's delegation of his decision-making authority "[does]
not.., relieve him of the responsibility for action taken pursuant to the
delegation."
350
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recognized
the need for administrators to exercise control over their decisionmaking
process, and the dangers presented when that responsibility is not met:
To protect these interests [life, health, and liberty] from
administrative arbitrariness, it is necessary, but not suffi-
cient, to insist on strict judicial scrutiny of administrative
action. For judicial review alone can correct only the most
egregious abuses. Judicial review must operate to ensure
that the administrative process itself will confine and control
the exercise of discretion. Courts should require adminis-
trative officers to articulate the standards and principles
that govern their discretionary decisions in as much detail
as possible. Rules and regulations should be freely formu-
lated by administrators, and revised when necessary. Dis-
cretionary decisions should more often be supported with
findings of fact and reasoned opinions. When administrators
provide a framework for principled decision-making [sic],
347 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2000).
349 Id. § 706(2)(a).350Skokomish Indian Tribe v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 587 F.2d. 428,431-32 (9th Cir. 1978).
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the result will be to diminish the importance of judicial
review by enhancing the integrity of the administrative
process, and to improve the quality of judicial review in
those cases where judicial review is sought.3"'
The Administrator is an administrative officer who, consistent with
his obligations under the federal environmental statutes and the APA, has
set out in detail standards and principles that are to govern his discre-
tionary decisions. These standards and principles are in his promulgated
rules, and the penalty policies he has issued through his delegated policy-
making officers. This is the "framework for principled decision-making
[sic] "352 that the Administrator has provided for those who serve him and
are subordinate to him on matters of law and policy, including the Board,
ALJs and his delegated complainants. But the concerns expressed by the
Court cannot be satisfied when the Administrator's decision makers adopt
a belief that their decisionmaking is independent of this framework estab-
lished by the Administrator and ignore it. Nor can those concerns be met
when the Board will adopt as a final decision of the Administrator an
initial decision of an AIA which the Board does not endorse,353 and which
the Board finds "does not appear to conform fully to the requirements set
forth in the [Administrator's] regulations."3 4
The same Court, addressing integrity in a legal process, has rec-
ognized that "[sitrategic or merely lazy circumventions of a legal process
grounded in a sound policy have the effect of eroding the regularized,
rational character of litigation to the detriment of practitioners and clients
alike."3 5
Strategic design and laziness are not the only ways in which a legal
process can be circumvented and eroded. When AIJs are recognized to have
the discretion to rule on issues of law without regard to criteria established
by the Administrator in his promulgated rules and published decisions,
and each of several ALJs informs his or her rulings with no more than his
or her own personal notions of fairness regarding any issue at hand, there
31' Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (citations
omitted).
352 Id.
353 In re F.R. & S, Inc., U.S. Envtl Prot. Agency Appeal No. CAA 03-2002-0215, 3 (March 17,
2005) (admin. review).
354 Id. at 1.
31' Harris v. Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 126 F.3d 339, 345 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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is also a "circumvention [ of a legal process" which can "have the effect of
eroding the regularized, rational character of litigation to the detriment
of practitioners and clients alike."356 Under such circumstances, parties
to a proceeding cannot know ahead of time whether the particular ALJ
presiding will apply the Administrator's rules and policies or whether the
ALJ will apply his or her own notions of process and policy, and without
knowing what if any legal standards and policy premises will be applied,
competent and professional preparation of cases by parties simply is not
possible. Moreover, without the consistent application of agency legal
standards and policy premises, it is not possible for the agency to provide
meaningful training to staff attorneys who prepare and present these
cases on behalf of the Administrator. Finally, as the entire purpose of the
Administrator's penalty assessment process is to provide a deterrent to
those who would otherwise damage the environment or put it at risk, any
erosion of the regularized, rational character of litigation carried on in that
process is a detriment to the Administrator's client, the public interests
Congress sought to further in the federal environmental statutes.
A distinctive characteristic of the administrative process is that
the judge in the process has legal authority only to issue initial decisions,
and in doing so is "[slubject to the published rules of the agency," with the
agency responsible for the content of the final decision.357 In addressing
the role of an AIJ, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized the
following:
The basic concept of the independent administra-
tive law judge requires that he conduct the cases over
which he presides with complete objectivity and independ-
ence. In so operating, however, he is governed, as in the
case of any trial court, by the applicable and controlling
precedents. These precedents include the applicable
statutes and agency regulations, the agency's policies as
laid down in its published decisions, and applicable court
decisions....
356Id.
357 5 U.S.C. §§ 556(c), 557(b) (2000).
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... [Oince the agency has ruled on a given matter,
[moreover,] it is not open to reargument by the adminis-
trative law judge; ... although an administrative law judge
on occasion may privately disagree with the agency's
treatment of a given problem, it is not his proper function
to express such disagreement in his published rulings or
decisions.358
Consequently, in determining an appropriate amount of penalty for
violations in an initial decision, an AIU is bound by law to comply with
the Administrator's Rules. Specifically, an ALJ must consider the Admin-
istrator's penalty policy, and, if determining a penalty amount appropriate
other than the amount proposed by the Administrator's delegated com-
plainant, an ALA must "set forth in the initial decision the specific reasons
for the increase or decrease.""' In determining whether to grant a motion
filed during the litigation of any penalty action before the Administrator,
the ALJ is bound by law to rule on the motion by applying criteria iden-
tified in the Administrator's promulgated rules and published decisions,
as such rules and decisions are applicable precedent.
No particular penalty policy of the Administrator, or, for that
matter, a particular promulgated rule, is sacrosanct. Based upon experi-
ence, rules and policies may be in need of periodic revision. On judicial
review, a violator who challenges the amount of penalty assessed by the
Administrator, determined by an application of his penalty policy, may be
able to convince a reviewing court that the policy, in whole or in part, is
"arbitrary and unauthorized by statute,"36 ° that it "operates as an edict,"36'
or that in some other manner it is defective.362
358 Iran Air v. Kugelman, 996 F.2d. 1253, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting Joseph Zwerdling,
Reflections on the Role of an Administrative Law Judge, 25 ADMIN. L. REv. 9, 12-13 (1973)).
159 40 C.F.R. § 22.27(b) (2006).
311 In re Hall Signs, Inc., U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency No. 5-EPCRA-96-026, 6 (Oct. 30, 1997)
(initial decision).361 In re GCA Chemical Corp., U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency No. TSCA-4-2000-0130, 12 (2002).
362 When challenged on judicial review, courts have upheld penalty amounts assessed by
the Administrator in final decisions issued by the Board, determined by applying the
Administrator's adopted penalty policy. An assessed penalty of $108,792 for EPCRA
violations was upheld, notwithstanding that, in his initial decision, the AU found a
penalty amount of $39,792 to be appropriate. See Catalina Yachts, Inc. v. U.S. EPA,
CV99-07357 (C.D.D.C. Calif. 2000). An accelerated decision assessing a penalty of $1.345
million for TSCA violations was upheld. Newell Recycling Co., Inc. v. EPA, 231 F.3d 204,
208-09 (5th Cir. 2000). A final penalty order issued by the Board assessing a $175,000
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Likewise, a court may determine on judicial review that some
procedural regulation of the Administrator is defective as a matter of law.
When a federal statute provides forjudicial review in a U.S. District Court
or U.S. Court of Appeals, it is the duty of the reviewing court to make those
determinations. Congress, however, has not invested ALJs with the author-
ity of a court of judicial review. An ALJ is a "creature of congressional
enactment" and a "semi-independent subordinate hearing officer"363 whose
decisionmaking Congress makes subordinate to the Administrator on
matters of law and policy, 364 and, therefore, an ALJ does not have the
authority to overturn the Administrator's rulemaking and policies, either
directly or simply by ignoring the rulemaking and policies.
If final decisions of the Administrator are to comply with APA
criteria and fulfill the Administrator's obligations, the Board cannot defer
to the discretion of an ALJ on matters of law and policy. On the contrary,
the Board has a duty to assure that findings and conclusions of law and
discretion in any final decision issued on behalf of the Administrator are
consistent with the rulemaking, policies and precedent of the Adminis-
trator, and, therefore, not arbitrary, capricious or "otherwise not in accor-
dance with law."365 If findings and conclusions of law and discretion in the
initial decision of an AIU are consistent with the rulemaking, policies and
precedent of the Administrator, the initial decision meets the criteria of
section 706 of the APA,366 and the Board is warranted in adopting the
ALJ's initial decision as the final decision of the Administrator. If the
initial decision does not meet those criteria, the Board must issue a final
decision and "modify, or set aside the findings of fact and conclusions of
law or discretion contained in the decision or order being reviewed," and
it must "set forth in the final order the reasons for its actions."367 To
fulfill its review obligations, the Board must assure that final decisions
issued on behalf of the Administrator are consistent, and not arbitrary,
penalty for FIFRA violations was upheld. Sultan Chemists, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 281 F.3d
73 (3rd Cir. 2002). In Newell Recycling Company, Inc., the Court noted that "[the Penalty
Policy makes the gravity-based determination process mostly mechanical by pegging the
above-described factors (the nature, circumstances, gravity and extent of the violation
[footnote omitted]) to statistical benchmarks or fixed formulations," but, based upon the
evidence, it held that the penalty amount assessed against Newell "rightly characterized
Newell's [violations] as a 'High Range, Level One' violations." Id. at 208.
3 Ramspeck v. Fed. Trial Exam'rs Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 132-33 (1953).
3 See supra note 24.
365 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A) (2000).
3 6 6 Id.
367 40 C.F.R. § 22.30(f) (2006).
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capricious or "otherwise not in accordance with law."36" To this it must
be added that, once the Board has ruled on a given matter in a published
decision of the Administrator, that ruling becomes agency precedent, and,
until such time as the Board might revise it, that precedent "is not open
to reargument by the [ALJ] .369
The proposed standard of review clearly is supported by the lan-
guage of the federal environmental statutes370 and the APA, 371 as inter-
preted by the courts; the Administrator's Rules;372 and the Administrator's
public pronouncement that the Board "is responsible for assuring consis-
tency in Agency adjudications by all of the AUJs" and that it "assures that
final decisions represent with [sic] the position of the Agency as a whole,
368 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000). For several years the GAO has been working with EPA in an
attempt to remedy the agency's "difficulties in ensuring consistent and equitable enforce-
ment actions among its regions and among the states," and has been reporting to Congress
on its efforts. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND
ENFORCEMENT: EPA'S EFFORT TO IMPROVE AND MAKE MORE CONSISTENT ITS COMPLIANCE
AND ENFORCEMENTACTIVITIES, 1 (2006) (containing the statement of John B. Stephenson,
Director, Natural Resources and Environment, before the Senate Committee on Environ-
ment and Public Works, 109th Cong.). A problem area identified by the GAO has been
inconsistency in the amount of penalties assessed for noncompliance with environmental
regulations. While acknowledging the agency's efforts to address its problems, the GAO
concluded, in part, "[w]hile we applaud EPA's actions, they have thus far achieved only
limited success and illustrate both the importance and the difficulty of addressing the long-
standing problems in ensuring the consistent application of enforcement requirements,
fines and penalties for violations of requirements." Id. at 13. It is the author's hope that,
in a positive and constructive way, by revisiting the fundamental principles of law gov-
erning the administrative process and illustrating the need for those who participate in
the process to conform with the governing law, this article contributes to efforts being made
to enable the Administrator's civil penalty assessment process to better manifest "the
consistent application of enforcement requirements, fines and penalties for violations"
of the federal environmental statutes and regulations. When, in accordance with the
Administrator's obligations under the governing statutes, the Board takes responsibility
for the consistent interpretation and application of the Administrator's rules and policy
in his final decisions, and ALJs accept their subordination to agency law and policy as
interpreted in the Board's decisions, the uniform law and policy applied in all cases will
enable the Administrator to move nearer to realizing the goal of consistency in his penalty
assessments. Moreover, the Administrator's enforcement staff in all regions can then look
to the Board's decisions to consistently prepare and present the Administrator's enforce-
ment actions, as can all parties who appear before the Administrator, knowing that the
principles of law and policy to be applied will not vary from AU to AIJ, and from case
to case.
369 Iran Air v. Kugelman, 996 F.2d. 1253, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
370 See supra note 12.
371 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 706 (2000).
372 40 C.F.R. §§ 22.27 & § 22.30 (2006).
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rather than just the position of' one ALJ.373 As the proposed standard of
review arises from the language of the statutory provisions governing the
administrative process rather than a template borrowed from the judicial
process, the consistent application of the standard will avoid the pitfall
of which Justice Frankfurter many years ago warned: failing to observe
the "vital differentiations between the functions ofjudicial and adminis-
trative tribunals," and, as a consequence, "read [ing] the laws of Congress
through the distorting lenses of inapplicable legal doctrine."37 4
"' Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing the Administrative Assessment of Civil
Penalties, 64 Fed. Reg. 40,138, 40,165 (July 23, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 22).
... FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 144 (1940).
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